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Article 
Justice in a Brave New World? 
JEAN R. STERNLIGHT 
As science fiction has become reality, we should consider the implications of 
our new technologies for our system of justice. In addition to DNA, we are now 
regularly using cameras, geo-tracking, facial recognition software, brain scans, 
computers, and much more to discern and record our physical and mental 
surroundings. Existing technology and more we cannot yet imagine will 
increasingly take the place of often unreliable evidence, such as that provided by 
eyewitnesses. Yet, we have given far too little thought as to how these advances 
should impact our civil and criminal dispute resolution systems. 
Historically, many justice systems have emphasized the importance of finding 
the truth. Our new forms of technology will arguably help us discover the truth, and 
thereby potentially enhance justice. Upon reflection, however, it is not clear that 
our scientific innovations will necessarily yield greater truth, much less justice. The 
products of our technology will inevitably be subject to human interpretation and 
argument, and justice has always been about far more than truth.  
This Article argues that we should focus on three critically important issues as 
we consider how to redesign our system of justice to accommodate our new 
technology. First, recognizing that judges and jurors will often lack the competence 
to interpret scientific data, we should rely more heavily on neutral scientific experts. 
Second, in light of the psychology of multiple interpretations, we will want to ensure 
that our technological evidence is interpreted by a diverse audience. Third, the 
greatest contribution of our powerful new technology may be that it helps us 
recognize that justice involves much more than finding the truth. Even assuming we 
could agree on what happened in the past, alternative visions of justice influence 
how a community will want to deal with past events, such as through punishment, 
compensation, reparations, apology, or in other ways. By deemphasizing the 
centrality of truth, we can focus more on other important aspects of justice, 
including examining motivations, healing community rifts, enunciating community 
norms, providing procedural justice, protecting human rights, and providing 
cost-effective access to our dispute resolution system. Focusing on this broad array 
 of concerns will encourage us to reform our litigation system in creative ways and 
also to rely more heavily on non-litigation approaches to justice.  
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Justice in a Brave New World? 
JEAN R. STERNLIGHT * 
INTRODUCTION 
A man was recently charged with a 1993 murder based on DNA 
obtained from a napkin he discarded at a hockey game.1 As science fiction 
has become reality, we must consider the implications of new technology 
for our system of justice. In addition to DNA, we are now regularly using 
cameras, geo-tracking, facial recognition software, brain scans, and more to 
discern and record our physical and mental surroundings.2 Our phone 
records, financial transactions, and social media are preserved not only in 
our devices but also in the “cloud.”3 We are even developing the capabilities 
to read emotions4 and memories.5 This technology and more we cannot yet 
imagine will increasingly take the place of often unreliable evidence, such 
as eyewitness testimony.6 Yet, while these technological advances are 
amazing, we have given far too little thought to how these scientific 
developments should impact our approach to civil and criminal  conflicts.  
Historically, many justice systems have emphasized the importance of 
finding the truth. Whether through trials by ordeal, oaths, or more modern 
trials, we have endeavored to find out who did what to whom and why. Part 
I summarizes this historical focus and then describes how new technology 
                                                                                                                     
* Michael and Sonja Saltman Professor of Law and Founding Director, Saltman Center for Conflict 
Resolution, University of Nevada – Las Vegas Boyd School of Law. I dedicate this Article to Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, whose work has greatly inspired my own. I received helpful feedback from 
presentations at Marquette University Law School and the AALS Dispute Resolution Section Works-in-
Progress session and from Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Michael Moffitt, Lydia Nussbaum, Andrea 
Schneider, Judy Sternlight, and Ron Wright. I am very grateful for the exceptional work done by UNLV 
law librarians Youngwoo Ban and Jennifer Gross and by my research assistants: Arthur Burns, Robin 
Gonzalez, Haley Jaramillo, Corey Juelke, Stacy Norris, and Shannon Zahm.   
1 Sarah Mervosh, DNA From Napkin Used at Hockey Game Leads to Charge in a 1993 Murder, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2019, at A9 (describing law enforcement’s use of genealogical databases to identify 
suspects). Similar technology was famously used to apprehend the alleged Golden State Killer, who was 
charged with murdering, raping, and burglarizing victims over several decades. See infra text 
accompanying note 72. 
2 See infra Section I.B. 
3 See infra text accompanying note 61.   
4 See infra text accompanying note 58. See also infra Section I.B.2 (discussing a variety of 
technologies used to directly and indirectly assess what people are thinking). 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 110–26.  
6 See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Science and the Legal System, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 1, 5 (2018) (explaining that the development of DNA testing shed light on the fallibility of 
eyewitness testimony). 
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will arguably help us discover the truth, thereby potentially enhancing 
justice.7   
Upon reflection, however, it is not clear that our scientific innovations 
will necessarily yield greater truth, much less justice. Part II.A explains that 
for technical, psychological, and philosophical reasons, new technology will 
not necessarily help us find truth. From a technical standpoint, mistakes will 
be made, and results can even be faked. Psychologically, even the most 
brilliant of technologies will ultimately be designed and interpreted by 
humans and thus be subject to human biases. Philosophically, perhaps any 
search for ultimate truth is doomed because no single truth exists.   
Part II.B argues that to the extent our new technology may help us find 
truth, its greater contribution, ironically, may be that it helps us recognize 
that justice involves much more than truth. Even assuming we could agree 
on what happened in the past, alternative visions of justice influence how a 
community will want to deal with that past, such as through punishment, 
compensation, reparations, apology, or in other ways. Both currently and 
historically, trials have never focused exclusively on truth. As well, 
non-adjudicatory processes such as mediation, negotiation, or community 
conferences have always emphasized aspects of justice other than truth. 
Whereas trials are generally structured to yield a single answer, other forms 
of dispute resolution are premised on recognition of complexity—that 
multiple truths can exist and that alternative solutions are possible.   
Finally, Part III considers how we ought to redesign our system of 
dispute resolution8 to accommodate our new technology and achieve greater 
justice. It suggests we look for processes to help us deal with three critically 
important issues: the inevitable fallibility of the technology, the psychology 
and philosophy of multiple interpretations, and the goals of dispute 
resolution that reach beyond merely finding the truth. By encouraging us to 
contemplate these and other issues, perhaps our technological innovations 
can help spark a rethinking of our system of justice that is even more exciting 
and innovative than the new technology itself.  
I. A FIRST TAKE—OUR NEW TECHNOLOGY WILL ENABLE TRIALS TO 
FULFILL THEIR PURPOSE OF UNCOVERING TRUTH 
A. Trials’ Purpose of Uncovering Truth 
In both the criminal and civil context,9 we often use trials to try to figure 
                                                                                                                     
7 While the privacy implications of our new technology are also both fascinating and disconcerting, 
that is not the subject of this Article. 
8 This Article uses the phrase “dispute resolution” to refer to both litigation and alternatives thereto, 
such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.  
9 While our society in the United States draws a sharp distinction between criminal and civil 
disputes, many other societies do not.   
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out who did what to whom or what and why, as well as to assess the impact 
of such actions.10 In the seventeenth century, Chief Justice Coke claimed 
that trials are “the finding out by due examination of the truth of the point in 
issue.”11 Indeed, “[i]n its widest meaning the word ‘trial’ is synonymous 
with ‘test,’” such as a scientific examination.12 More recently, Judge Marvin 
Frankel simply stated: “Trials occur because there are questions of fact. In 
principle, the paramount objective is the truth.”13 While trials are clearly 
designed to do justice, as well as to seek truth, it is clear that truth-seeking 
lies at the heart of many legal disputes.14   
                                                                                                                     
10 Admittedly, trials have become a rarity in both the civil and criminal context in the United States. 
As to civil trials, see, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 
YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012); Marc Galanter & Angela Frozena, The Continuing Decline of Civil Trials in 
American Courts, POUND CIV. JUST. INST. 3–6 (2011), http://www.poundinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/2011-Forum-Galanter-Frozena-Paper-1.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2019). As to 
criminal trials, recent federal statistics show just over two percent of cases going to jury trial. Federal 
Judicial Caseload Statistics: Table D-4. U.S. District Courts—Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Type 
of Disposition and Offense, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2017, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 31, 
2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_d4_0331.2017.pdf. State statistics 
are similar. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES 24 tbl.21 (2013), 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4845 (showing two percent of felony convictions 
resulted from trials). Nonetheless, trials remain important because they are the backdrop for both 
settlements, see, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968–69 (1979), and dispositive motions such as motions for 
summary judgment. Prosecutors consider how evidence would play to a jury in deciding which cases to 
bring, how to structure those cases, and whether to enter into plea negotiations. Anna Offit, Prosecuting 
in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. L. REV. 1071, 1072–73 (2019).   
11 1 JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS IN ENGLAND AND EUROPE, 1200–1700: THE TRIAL IN HISTORY 5 
(Maureen Mulholland & Brian Pullan eds., 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also JEROME 
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 80 (1950) (questioning trials’ 
ability to find truth); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability 
of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1360 (1985) (“A trial is ostensibly structured as a truth-seeking 
process concerned with justice for the parties.”). 
12 Mullholland & Pullan, supra note 11, at 2 (discussing the use of “trials” to test faith, in the Old 
Testament, and describing the use of trials in scientific contexts, to evaluate data). In medieval England 
the “why” was at least as important as the “what.” Juries focused substantially on the hearts and minds 
of the accused, and acquitted most accused. ELIZABETH PAPP KAMALI, FELONY AND THE GUILTY MIND 
IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 1–2 (2019).  
13 Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1033 
(1975) (contending that while truth is the theoretical goal, in practice our adversarial system does not 
serve the goal as well as it might, and therefore suggesting potential reforms to our adversarial system). 
Cf. Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel’s Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1063 (1975) 
(urging that while a trial is, in part, a search for truth, it also serves many other purposes including 
protecting the dignity interests and constitutional rights of the parties). 
14 Cf. John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 541–42 
(1978) (asserting that distributive and procedural justice are more central in most legal disputes than is 
the determination of truth). While Thibaut and Walker assert that a small category of disputes involve 
“strong elements of both truth and justice claims,” id. at 542, I believe that many if not most legal claims 
involve disputes as to both truth and justice. See also Justin Sevier, A [Relational] Theory of Procedure, 
104 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 54), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3405763 (drawing on empirical studies to critique 
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Until recently, we typically relied on witness testimony, physical 
evidence, or (longer ago) purported supernatural insights to try to find the 
truth. In some societies, disputes have been resolved by community 
members who might have personal knowledge of the events that transpired 
or the character of the disputants.15 When personal knowledge was scant, 
trials by ordeal, trials by battle,16 and oaths17 were sometimes used to try to 
determine who was lying and who was telling the truth. One common ordeal 
required accused criminals to plunge their arms into boiling water to retrieve 
a ring, as a means of determining whether the accused had committed the 
crime.18 If the arm of the accused was not harmed, he was found not guilty, 
on the theory that God had protected the arm of an innocent man.19 Such 
trials were used not only in medieval Europe but also in various other parts 
of the world.20 Although trials by ordeal today sound both sadistic and 
absurd, one economist has argued they may have been a fairly effective 
                                                                                                                     
Thibaut and Walker’s truth-justice dichotomy as incomplete and asserting instead that the public’s 
perception of legal disputes depends upon both the nature and stage of the dispute).  
15 E.g., JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN 
SPECIAL JURIES 3 (2006).  
16 See, e.g., Morton W. Bloomfield, Beowulf, Byrhtnoth, and the Judgment of God: Trial by Combat 
in Anglo-Saxon England, 44 SPECULUM 545, 551 (1969) (“Trial by combat and ordeals in general were 
methods used to get at the truth when oaths or compurgation would not elicit an unambiguous answer.”). 
With trial by battle, “God was expected to support the truthful combatant.” VICKIE L. ZIEGLER, TRIAL 
BY FIRE AND BATTLE IN MEDIEVAL GERMAN LITERATURE 8 (2004). 
17 The medieval oath essentially took the place of witness testimony in that a sworn oath on relevant 
matters had to be accepted and would end the legal dispute. See Rebecca V. Colman, Reason and 
Unreason in Early Medieval Law, 4 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 571, 576 (1974) (“The majority of civil and 
criminal cases were settled by oath-swearing . . . .”). However, while oaths were commonly used to 
resolve cases, Colman reports that the preferred means to resolve disputes was “certain proof,” with oath-
swearers or ordeal to be used only when certain proof was not available. Id. at 578–79. 
18 See Trisha Olson, Of Enchantment: The Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury Trial, 50 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 115–17 (2000) (discussing the use of ordeals as a method of proof in medieval 
Europe and use of the “ordeal of the cauldron”). Although medieval Europeans employed trials by ordeal, 
these were not the primary means by which they resolved disputes. Rather, European societies used non-
ordeal trials as well as various forms of mediation and negotiation throughout the period when they also 
relied on ordeals. See, e.g., THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE 236–37 
(Wendy Davies & Paul Fouracre eds., 1986).  
19 See, e.g., ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL BY FIRE AND WATER: THE MEDIEVAL JUDICIAL ORDEAL 1 
(1986). This belief, that God would protect the innocent, was called iudicium Dei (judgment of God). 
Peter T. Leeson, Ordeals, 55 J.L. & ECON. 691, 692 (2012). Additional ordeal practices included having 
the accused grasp or walk on a red-hot piece of iron to see if they would remain unscathed or throwing 
the accused into water to see if they would demonstrate their innocence by sinking. BARTLETT, supra, at 
2. 
20 See, e.g., BARTLETT, supra note 19, at 2 (“Ordeals of fire and water have been employed by 
peoples in many different parts of the world and throughout history. They crop up in the laws of 
Hammurabi and in the judicial practice of modern Kenya; men have undergone the ordeal from Iceland 
to Polynesia, from Japan to Africa.”); H. GOITEIN, PRIMITIVE ORDEAL AND MODERN LAW 54–55, 58–
60 (1923) (discussing uses of ordeals by a broad range of societies including Hindu, Siamese, Iranian, 
African, European, and others).  
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means of uncovering the truth.21 In a world where everyone believes in 
God’s power to determine truth and make that truth known, only the 
innocent would typically willingly subject themselves to ordeals.22 
As our ancestors’ faith in the supernatural lapsed,23 they instituted more 
rationally-based inquisitorial and adversarial trials in front of either judges 
or juries. In the inquisitorial system, used in most parts of Europe24 and 
commonly throughout the world,25 the judge generally conducts hearings, 
determines the law, examines witnesses and experts, and orders the 
production of relevant documents.26 The role of the judge is highlighted in 
the inquisitorial system because it is thought that judges, more than 
disputants or attorneys, will place the appropriate emphasis on finding the 
truth.27 
Similarly, those who favor the adversarial approach to trials urge that 
litigation brought between adverse parties is analogous to gladiators’ 
competition and is even more successful than inquisition in uncovering the 
truth.28   
                                                                                                                     
21 Leeson, supra note 19, at 711. 
22 Id. at 697–98 (employing rational choice theory to investigate the relationship between 
superstition and law and suggesting that the priests who set up the trials may have knowingly or 
unknowingly manipulated them to ensure that at least most of the defendants would be found to have 
passed the trial).   
23 Pope Innocent III and the Fourth Lateran Council of the Church banned the use of trials by ordeal 
in 1215 on the ground that they were inconsistent with scripture. Finbarr McAuley, Canon Law and the 
End of the Ordeal, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 473, 499, 508–11 (2006).   
24 Trials by jury became common in England and trials by inquisition in the rest of Europe. 2 
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE 
TIME OF EDWARD I 138–44 (2d ed. 1923). 
25 While U.S. commentators typically look to Germany or France to gain an understanding of the 
inquisitorial approach, some have noted that we have significant inquisitorial elements in our own 
system. The equity system used in the early years of this country was primarily inquisitorial, and the 
more recent reliance on managerial judges and magistrates can also be seen as a rejuvenation of the 
inquisitorial tradition. See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due 
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1225 (2005) 
(describing the “transformation” of the adversary system).   
26  Id. at 1188; John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
823, 827 (1985) (“Digging for facts is primarily the work of the judge.”). Although the parties and their 
attorneys may make suggestions, it is typically thought unethical for lawyers to “prepare” witnesses for 
their testimony. Mirjan Damaška, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1083, 1088–89 (1975); W. Zeidler, Evaluation of the Adversary System: As Comparison, Some 
Remarks on the Investigatory System of Procedure, 55 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 390, 394 (1981).  
27 See Langbein, supra note 26, at 847 (urging that factfinding is the central task of civil litigation 
and that an inquisitorial system is more likely than an adversarial system to be effective in determining 
truth); see also Justin Sevier, The Truth-Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy and 
Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 212 
(2014) (summarizing conflicting literature on the relative strength of the adversarial and inquisitorial 
justice systems in finding truth, but concluding that Americans tend to believe inquisitorial systems are 
better at finding truth and adversarial systems are better at providing justice).  
28 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 383–84 
(1978) (explaining how an advocate “plays his role” in the adversary system); Gerald Walpin, America’s 
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In the adversarial model the parties are responsible for 
initiating and conducting the litigation. They gather all the 
evidence and present it orally, in open court, subjecting 
witnesses to examination and cross-examination, and the court 
serves as a neutral umpire, deciding the questions of fact and 
law raised by the parties.29 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has asserted that cross examination is “the 
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.”30 The jury 
often plays an important role in the adversarial system. Initially, English 
juries were composed of community members who “came from the 
neighborhood, and some of them, at least, were expected to know or to find 
out the facts of the dispute in litigation, rather than to reach a verdict based 
exclusively on evidence introduced in court.”31 Later, juries evolved to base 
their deliberations only on evidence produced in court, but still focused on 
ferreting out the truth.32 
In short, while the forms of trials have changed over the years, we have 
frequently emphasized the goal of trials to uncover the truth of what 
occurred in the past.33 This quest for truth is also reflected in our due process 
jurisprudence, which highlights the need to provide procedures that will lead 
to truthful and accurate findings.34  
B. New Technology Can Aid in the Search for Truth 
On first impression it seems obvious that our new world of technology 
will make it far easier to figure out who did what to whom, and why. Where 
                                                                                                                     
Adversarial and Jury Systems: More Likely to Do Justice, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175, 176–78 
(2003) (discussing the “attributes” of the roles in an adversary system, including the need to “neutralize 
or destroy” evidence unfavorable to a client’s case). 
29 Kessler, supra note 25, at 1188 (citations omitted). See also Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, 
in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34, 34 (Harold Berman ed., 1971) (calling the adversary system “a 
philosophy that insists on keeping distinct the function of the advocate . . . from that of the judge, or of 
the judge from that of jury”); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND 
DEFENSE 49 (1984) (explaining that the parties initiate the proceedings and lawyers gather information, 
but the judge is the most important player in the adversarial model); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of 
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 14 AM. LAW. 445, 447 (1906) (calling the 
adversary system a “sporting theory” of justice). 
30 See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1979) (quoting 5 WIGMORE § 1367).  
31 OLDHAM, supra note 15, at 3. Such juries were said to be “self-informing.” 
32 Id. (estimating that this “modern” jury emerged in the 1500s).  
33 See generally John D. Jackson, Theories of Truth Finding in Criminal Procedure: An 
Evolutionary Approach, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 475 (1988) (summarizing ongoing debate over whether 
inquisitorial or instead adversarial processes are better at uncovering the truth). 
34 See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a 
person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.”). 
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we once depended upon such limited evidence as eyewitness testimony,35 
confessions,36 and documents, over time we also began to look at skid marks, 
dents, bullet casings, footprints, and similar physical evidence.37 Next, the 
development of purportedly more reliable evidence, including fingerprint 
analysis,38 lie detectors,39 and particularly DNA analysis,40 has offered many 
more tools to determine who did what, where, when, and to some degree 
why. While many of these tools are far less powerful than many may 
assume,41 juries these days tend to crave the supposed certainty of such 
evidence—what some have called the “CSI effect.”42 
Technology emerging today is more ubiquitous and more powerful, thus 
potentially helping us to better answer these “what happened” questions in 
both the civil and criminal context.43 Given the rapid arc of technological 
development,44 it is clear that we will soon have even more investigatory 
                                                                                                                     
35 Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research and Legal 
Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765, 765 (1995) (“[M]istaken eyewitness identification 
is the single largest source of wrongful convictions.”).   
36 See generally Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and 
Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 49 (2010) (reviewing literature on police-induced confessions 
and risk factors for error). 
37 It turned out much of this evidence was not as good as we thought, though DNA identifications 
can be quite helpful. For a damning critique of some of the technology upon which we have relied, see 
Michael Saks & David Faigman, Failed Forensics: How Forensic Science Lost Its Way and How It Might 
Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149, 154–56 (2008). See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF 
THE NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT] (discussing the findings of a 
congressionally authorized forensic study); D. Michael Risinger, Whose Fault?—Daubert, the NAS 
Report and the Notion of Error in Forensic Science, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 519, 519 n.3 (2010) 
(discussing the NAS Report). 
38 See infra text accompanying note 61–66.  
39 See infra text accompanying note 99–103. 
40 DNA analysis has been widely used to exonerate the innocent. BRANDON L. GARRETT, 
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 216 (2011); see also When 
They See Us, NETFLIX (2019), https://www.netflix.com/title/80200549 (Netflix series discussing 
eventual use of DNA as well as confession to exonerate five young men infamously accused and 
convicted of raping a Central Park jogger). 
41 See infra Section I.B.1.  
42 See, e.g., Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the ‘CSI Effect’ Effect: Media and 
Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1336–37 (2009) (discussing the “CSI effect”); 
N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction about Forensic Science Affects the 
Public’s Expectations About Real Forensic Science, 47 JURIMETRICS 357, 357–58 (2007) (discussing the 
CSI effect and a study that found that CSI viewers were more critical of forensic evidence at trial). 
However, while the media is well convinced that the CSI effect is real, not all legal scholars and 
investigators are sure that it is. Cole & Dioso-Villa, supra, at 1340–42. 
43 See infra Section I.B.1. 
44 See, e.g., W. BRIAN ARTHUR, THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT EVOLVES 
191–200 (2009) (discussing how the economy evolves with technology); RAY KURZWEIL, THE 
SINGULARITY IS NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY 51–56 (2006) (explaining the life cycle 
of technology).   
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tools. The next sections discuss both technologies geared to track past events 
and also those designed to access the human brain.  
1. The Technology of What Happened 
Our new technology provides us with three ways to learn who did what, 
when, and where. First, devices record our actions and communications. 
Second, we can identify physical traces that we leave as we move through 
the world. Third, technology allows us to be followed in real time as we 
move through the physical world and as we take actions using that 
technology.  
i. Recording Devices 
Computers, phones, cameras, audio recording devices, and other kinds 
of recording tools play a greater and greater role in figuring out who did 
what, when, and to whom.45 In this country and others,46 many public and 
private entities are placing cameras on streets, within public buses, and 
inside and outside buildings, so that if “something” happens, a record will 
exist.47 A few years ago cameras on a public bus, outside a gym, at a 
tollbooth, and at an ATM, were used to track down the alleged killers of a 
law professor who was mysteriously murdered in his driveway in 
Tallahassee, Florida.48 Another better-known example was law 
enforcement’s use of commercial and bystander photos to catch the Boston 
Marathon bombers in 2013.49 Today, when crimes happen, it is becoming 
                                                                                                                     
45 See RANDOLPH LEWIS, UNDER SURVEILLANCE: BEING WATCHED IN MODERN AMERICAN 2 
(2017) (discussing the “many different faces” of Big Brother); Robert Draper, They Are Watching You—
and Everything Else on the Planet, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/02/surveillance-watching-you/ (describing the use 
of CCTV monitoring in London to capture two gang members). 
46 London has an extensive CCTV system of cameras “used to tackle crime and anti-social 
behaviour.” CCTV, CITY LONDON POLICE, https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/advice-and-
support/Pages/Public-Space-Surveillance-Camera-System-.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2019) (stating that 
the City of London Police control room monitors 100 public space surveillance cameras across the City 
of London, with the capability of moving 360 degrees and positioned so that they do not intrude into 
private areas).  
47 See, e.g., Rick Rojas, In Newark, Police Cameras, and the Internet, Watch You, N.Y. TIMES (June 
9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/nyregion/newark-surveillance-cameras-police.html (“In 
Chicago, the police have established surveillance centers where officers can watch incoming feeds from 
some 30,000 closed-circuit cameras.”); 7 Chilling Crimes That Were Solved Thanks to Surveillance 
Cameras, HUFFPOST (Feb. 10, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/10/chilling-
crimes-caught-on-camera_n_6357324.  
48 Sean Rossman, Prius Trailed Dan Markel on Final Morning, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (June 
2, 2016, 10:47 AM), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2016/06/02/dan-markels-final-
morning/85290112. 
49 See Patrick J. Kiger, How They Identified the Bombers, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://channel.nationalgeographic.com/inside-the-hunt-for-the-boston-bombers/articles/how-they-
identified-the-bombers/ [http://perma.cc/ED45-9DTA] (explaining how video footage from various 
sources allowed law enforcement to identify and apprehend the bombing suspects).  
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common for police to ask businesses and individuals to check and preserve 
their video recordings in order to help find the perpetrators.50 In addition to 
fixed cameras, we know that many individuals record events with their 
phones.51 Police officers and police vehicles are increasingly equipped with 
cameras and audio.52 Robots, toys, and other machines that are increasingly 
part of our lives also may contain cameras and audio.53 Law enforcement, 
family, nosy neighbors, or others may also be able to film what we are doing 
using miniature insect-sized drones.54 As cameras become even smaller and 
easier to use, we can expect that they will become ubiquitous, as illustrated 
in the 2017 movie, The Circle.55  
In addition to cameras, other devices are increasingly being used to 
record human activity. For example, law enforcement is employing facial 
recognition and iris or retinal scans56 to identify persons based on their 
                                                                                                                     
50 Faith Karimi, Home Surveillance Cameras Are the New Neighborhood Watch, CNN (Aug. 31, 
2018, 2:11 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/30/us/home-surveillance-cameras-neighborhood-
watch/index.html (“In Illinois, the O’Fallon Police Department asked residents to help fight crime by 
investing in neighborhood surveillance cameras and registering them with authorities. ‘Video 
surveillance is one of the best methods for apprehending criminals and convicting suspects who are 
caught in the act of committing a crime,’ the O’Fallon Police Department said in a statement.”). 
51 See, e.g., Lindsey Bever, Man Who Filmed S.C. Police Shooting: Maybe God ‘Put Me There for 
Some Reason’, WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2015/04/09/meet-the-man-whose-video-led-to-murder-charge-against-south-carolina-
cop/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.52d2ea729264 (reporting on Feidin Santana’s decision to record a 
white police officer firing his pistol at a fleeing, unarmed black man); see also Rose Eveleth, How Many 
Photographs of You Are Out There in the World?, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/how-many-photographs-of-you-are-out-there-
in-the-world/413389/ (noting that snapchat users share 8796 photos every second and, in 2013, Facebook 
users uploaded more than 350 million images each day). 
52 See MARY D. FAN, CAMERA POWER:  PROOF, POLICING, PRIVACY, AND AUDIOVISUAL BIG DATA 
8 (2019) (examining phenomenon of “toutveillance”—a society in which “people and the police are 
recording each other from all directions, making everyone at once surveilled and surveillor”); Mary D. 
Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68 ALA. L. REV. 395, 399 (2016) 
(“Law enforcement agencies are rapidly getting on the body camera bandwagon because officers are 
realizing that recording encounters can help rebuild public trust, improve public as well as officer 
behavior, and protect against false complaints.”). 
53 Margot E. Kaminski et al., Averting Robot Eyes, 76 MD. L. REV. 983, 985–98 (2017); Kimiko de 
Freytas-Tamura, The Bright-Eyed Talking Doll that Just Might Be a Spy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/technology/cayla-talking-doll-hackers.html (reporting on new 
doll that records and reports the voices of children to its parent corporation). 
54 See Dario Floreano & Robert J. Wood, Science, Technology and the Future of Small Autonomous 
Drones, 521 NATURE 460, 460 (2015) (explaining that improved technological capabilities have allowed 
for the increasing use of miniature drones for civilian applications). 
55 THE CIRCLE (STX Films and EuropaCorp 2017).  
56 See, e.g., Jessica Gabel Cino, Opinion, How Does Facial Recognition Technology Work?, 
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 30, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/facial-recognition-facial-
recognition-technology-technology-privacy-privacy-592117 (reporting on executive order that expands 
facial recognition systems in major U.S. airports to monitor people leaving the United States, in hopes 
of catching people who have overstayed their visas or are wanted in criminal investigations); Colin 
Lecher & Russell Brandom, The FBI has Collected 430,000 Iris Scans in a So-Called ‘Pilot Program’, 
VERGE (July 12, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/7/12/12148044/fbi-iris-pilot-
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images.57 One recent study showed that nearly fifty percent of all 
Americans’ images are now contained in a facial recognition database being 
built from driver’s licenses and other images.58 Artificial intelligence is also 
being developed to allow us to identify emotions, as well as faces.59 When 
we use our phones and other computers to communicate or create 
documents, we leave evidence on the devices themselves60 and often also in 
the “cloud.”61 
ii. Identifying Our Physical Traces 
The two best known and most used means for tracking our physical 
traces are fingerprints and DNA. For many years, fingerprints were thought 
                                                                                                                     
program-ngi-biometric-database-aclu-privacy-act (stating that one police department has collected iris 
data from at least 200,000 arrestees between 2013 and 2016). 
57 See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-
recognition.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share (discussing new app, marketed to law enforcement, that has 
scraped over three billion images from millions of websites and social media). The FBI’s Next 
Generation Identification program uses a broad array of tools including palm prints, irises, and facial 
recognition to provide what the Agency called “the world’s largest and most efficient repository of 
biometric and criminal history information.” Next Generation Identification (NGI), FED. BUREAU 
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-other-biometrics/ngi (last visited 
June 12, 2018). In Great Britain, the police have equipped some of their vans with facial recognition 
software so that they can drive around town and search for purported criminals. Dell Cameron, British 
Cops Make First Arrest Using Facial Recognition Surveillance Vans, GIZMODO (June 6, 2017, 12:30 
PM), http://gizmodo.com/british-cops-make-first-arrest-using-facial-recognition-1795852963. In China, 
police officers are equipped with facial recognition glasses, and cameras powered by artificial 
intelligence are placed all around the country in an effort to fight crime and catch suspects. Paul Mozur, 
Inside China’s Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame and Lots of Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/china-surveillance-technology.html.  
58 Clare Garvie et al., The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, 
GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org. 
59 Tim Lewis, AI Can Read Your Emotions. Should It?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2019, 11:00 EDT), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/aug/17/emotion-ai-artificial-intelligence-mood-
realeyes- amazon-facebook-emotient; see also 60 Minutes, What’s on the Horizon for A.I.? (CBS 
television broadcast commercial June 23, 2017), 
https://www.cbs.com/shows/60_minutes/video/vgqb09XuRGuCVynSsk3ZYCRV8WA257PX/ what-s-
on-the-horizon-for-a-i-/. 
60 See, e.g., In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During Execution of a Search Warrant on a 
Black Lexus IS300, Cal. License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401, at *1 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (ordering Apple to assist law enforcement in accessing the information on an iPhone 
seized when executing a search warrant on the San Bernardino shooter’s vehicle); Clark D. 
Cunningham, Apple and the American Revolution: Remembering Why We Have the Fourth Amendment, 
126 YALE L.J.F. 216, 216 (2016) (discussing the Department of Justice’s attempts to access alleged 
evidence on phones).  
61 Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors 
in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 362–64 (2010) (describing “the cloud” and 
its capabilities); iCloud: What is iCloud, APPLE (June 20, 
2019), https://support.apple.com/kb/PH2608?locale=en_US. 
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to provide a unique identifier,62 and law enforcement began to use them in 
the early 1900s.63 As various law enforcement agencies have acquired banks 
of fingerprints, and as courts have accepted fingerprints as evidence,64 the 
technique has become more and more valuable.65 Our evolving fingerprint 
technology even allowed investigators to identify the remains of a body that 
had been buried in a potter’s field forty-five years earlier.66 While the tool is 
certainly not infallible,67 it has undoubtedly provided us with a great deal of 
information. 
Tracing DNA is far more powerful than identifying fingerprints. After 
scientists famously discovered its unique molecular structure,68 U.S. law 
enforcement began to use DNA secreted in blood, hair, semen, or other 
substances to potentially identify persons who had perpetrated criminal or 
other acts.69 One famous early use of DNA evidence was the O.J. Simpson 
murder trial in 1995, in which prosecutors sought to use blood stains to 
implicate O.J. as the killer of his ex-wife.70 Today, law enforcement 
authorities are both augmenting their own DNA databases and also 
                                                                                                                     
62 See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 
13, 13–31 (2001) (providing history of our reliance on fingerprint analysis and noting that author Mark 
Twain helped popularize the use of fingerprints as a law enforcement tool in his book Pudd’nhead Wilson 
(1893)); see also Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters 
with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1100–06 (1998) (explaining why courts 
came to accept fingerprint identification so easily despite a lack of scientific validation); see generally 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE SCIENCE OF FINGERPRINTS: CLASSIFICATION AND USES (1985) 
(discussing the uses and classifications of fingerprints). 
63 Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence, supra note 62, at 20. 
64 See generally Jennifer Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions 
of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 127–41 (2008) (contrasting courts’ almost 
universal acceptance of the validity of fingerprint analysis with experts’ wide-ranging skepticism as to 
the scientific validity of the tool).   
65 See, e.g., Jennifer Lynch, FBI Combines Civil and Criminal Fingerprints into One Fully 
Searchable Database, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 18, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/09/little-fanfare-fbi-ramps-biometrics-programs-yet-again-part-1 
(describing the FBI’s new policy of combining civil and criminal fingerprints into one fully searchable 
database). 
66 Michael Wilson, Solved: The 47-Year Mystery of a Murder Victim’s Many Identities, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/nyregion/unsolved-harlem-murder.html. 
67 See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint 
Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 990–91 (2005) (discussing fallibility and error rates 
in fingerprinting); Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification, supra note 64, at 141 
(arguing that fingerprint science has not been sufficiently validated to be admissible in court); see also 
infra text accompanying notes 178–81 (discussing how human mental frailties can lead to problems with 
fingerprint evidence). 
68 James D. Watson & Francis H. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Structure for 
Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737, 737–38 (1953). 
69 JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC DNA TYPING 48 (2010); SHEILA JASANOFF, 
SCIENCE AT THE BAR:  LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 55 (1995). 
70 See William C. Thompson, DNA Evidence in the O.J. Simpson Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 827, 
827 (1996) (arguing that a jury could reasonably have concluded that the DNA evidence in the Simpson 
case deserved little or no weight).  
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increasingly looking to privately maintained databases.71 Further, DNA 
tools are being refined so that scientists can potentially identify persons 
using DNA identifiers provided by their relatives, as well as by themselves. 
As a result, in several widely-publicized cases, police have used ancestry 
databases to track down purported criminals, including the alleged Golden 
State Killer.72 Additionally, police are now implementing a “DNA Magic 
Box” that will allow them to use the technology more quickly and cheaply.73 
While, as with fingerprints, the DNA identification tool is not infallible,74 
clearly it has led to major changes in our justice system. DNA is regularly 
being used in criminal trials,75 heavily featured on crime drama shows such 
as CSI,76 may be used in civil contexts,77 and is even being employed to 
identify whose dog littered its poop in a common area.78 DNA has also 
sometimes helped liberate those who have been wrongly convicted.79  
                                                                                                                     
71 See ERIN E. MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL: THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DNA 15–16 (2015) for a 
discussion of the national DNA database first established in 1998. See also Erin Murphy, DNA in the 
Criminal Justice System: A Congressional Research Service Report* (*From the Future), 64 UCLA L. 
REV. DISCOURSE 340, 343 (2016) (observing that, as of 2016, the CODIS database contained roughly 
fifteen million known person files and seven hundred thousand forensic profiles, drawing on samples 
from “convicted persons, arrested persons, unidentified remains, missing persons, and relatives of 
missing persons”).  
72 Heather Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case. Here’s What She’s Going to 
Do Next., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/science/barbara-rae-
venter-gsk.html; see also Heather Murphy, Genealogy Sites Have Helped Identify Suspects. Now They’ve 
Helped Convict One, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/us/dna-genetic-
genealogy-trial.html (describing how genetic genealogy has “redefined the cutting edge of forensic 
science”). 
73 Heather Murphy, Coming Soon to a Police Station Near You: The DNA ‘Magic Box’, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/science/dna-crime-gene-technology.html. 
74 See MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL, supra note 71, at 3–5. 
75 Id. at 288–95. 
76 CSI: Crime Scene Investigation (CBS television broadcast 2000–2015).  
77 DNA could potentially be used to establish paternity, Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of 
Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 325, 365–70 (2005), to identify the alleged wrongdoer in an accident, DNA Evidence in a Personal 
Injury or Accident Claim, MEINHART, SMITH, & MANNING PLLC, 
https://www.bluegrassjustice.com/personal-injury/dna-evidence/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019), or to prove 
cellular damage due to chemical exposure, Mark Hansen, DNA Poised to Show its Civil Side, A.B.A. J. 
(Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/dna_poised_to_show_its_civil_side. 
78 Some apartment buildings have required their dog owners to provide DNA samples from their 
dog, so that when poop is found on the premises it can be linked to the proper dog and appropriate 
measures can be taken. Danny Lewis, Dog Owners Beware, DNA in Dog Poop Could Be Used to Track 
You Down, SMITHSONIAN (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/dog-owners-
beware-dna-dog-poop-could-used-track-you-down-180958596/. 
79 See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO 
MAKE IT RIGHT xv–xxiii, 359 (2003). While some might assume that law enforcement would jump at 
the opportunity to use the most recent scientific tools, instead it seems that many police and prosecutors 
are often resistant to the new approaches. DAVID A. HARRIS, FAILED EVIDENCE: WHY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE 2 (2012) (“With the exception of DNA (and then, only sometimes), 
most of our police and prosecutorial agencies do not welcome the findings of science; they do not rush 
to incorporate the latest scientific advances into their work.”).    
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We leave traces not only with our fingerprints and our DNA, but also in 
other ways that scientists are beginning to track. For example, the particular 
combination of bacteria hosted by each of us is fairly unique, and we leave 
bacterial traces as we breathe, excrete, lose hairs, and so on.80 Thus, even 
when rapists use gloves, masks, and condoms to protect against fingerprint 
and DNA identification, they can potentially be identified through the 
bacteria in the pubic hair they leave behind.81 Microbes left on keyboards, 
phones, or shoes could also be used to identify suspects who did not leave 
DNA or fingerprint traces.82 Further, scientists are developing the ability to 
track our medical conditions through our sweat.83 Presumably, scientists will 
continue to develop even more sophisticated means to follow our traces.  
iii. Tracking Our Movement 
Today’s technology also allows us to track movement directly, through 
technology installed in our devices or even potentially our bodies. For 
example, when we make calls on our mobile phones, the signals bounce 
between cell towers, thereby allowing technicians to trace the source of the 
call.84 Phones can also be tracked directly through many applications.85 It 
appears that some commercial companies86 and law enforcement87 are 
                                                                                                                     
80 Jarrad T. Hampton-Marcell et al., The Human Microbiome: An Emerging Tool in Forensics, 
MICROBIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY (Feb. 27, 2017), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5328825/; Kai Kupferschmidt, How Your Microbiome 
Can Put You at the Scene of the Crime, SCIENCE (Mar. 8, 2016, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/how-your-microbiome-can-put-you-scene-crime. 
81 Dalmeet Singh Chawla, Bacteria on Pubic Hair Could Be Used to Identify Rapists, SCIENCE 
(Dec. 15, 2014, 8:00 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2014/12/bacteria-pubic-hair-could-be-
used-identify-rapists.   
82  Ed Yong, Can the Microbes You Leave Behind Be Used to Identify You?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC 
(May 11, 2015), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/phenomena/2015/05/11/can-the-
microbes-you-leave-behind-be-used-to-identify-you/. 
83 Apoorva Mandavilli, Your Sweat Will See You Now, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/health/wearable-tech-sweat.html. 
84 Season 1 of the podcast Serial examines how this technology was used to convict Adnan Syed 
of the murder of his former girlfriend. The Alibi, SERIAL (Oct. 3, 2014), https://serialpodcast.org/season-
one. 
85 The iPhone, for example, allows persons to voluntarily provide others with access to their location 
data. Locations Services & Privacy, APPLE (Mar. 25, 2019), https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT207056; 
Track and Find Your Missing Apple Device, APPLE, https://support.apple.com/explore/find-my-iphone-
ipad-mac-watch (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). Android phones can also be tracked. Cara McGoogan, 
Millions of Android Phones Could Be Tracked with Ultrasonic Spying Tool, TELEGRAPH (May 8, 2017, 
11:36 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/05/08/millions-android-phones-could-
tracked-ultrasonic-spying-tool/.   
86See Chirag Kulkarni, 15 Ways Geolocation Is Totally Changing Marketing, FORTUNE (Feb. 6, 
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/06/geolocation-marketing/ (showing how companies use targeted 
advertising to send customers advertisements based on their location).  
87 Andy Greenberg, How the CIA Can Hack Your Phone, PC, and TV (Says Wikileaks), WIRED 
(Mar. 7, 2017, 4:03 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/cia-can-hack-phone-pc-tv-says-wikileaks/; 
Brad Heath, Police Secretly Track Cellphones to Solve Routine Crimes, USA TODAY (Aug. 24, 2015, 
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already using such tracking tools, and it seems likely that this use will 
increase exponentially in the future, though as in other contexts, courts will 
have to wrestle with evidentiary and privacy issues.88 
Phones are not the only method of tracking our whereabouts directly. 
For example, in one case a man used his “Fitbit” data to support his alibi in 
a murder investigation,89 and a woman’s “Fitbit” data was used to prove her 
husband killed her.90 In addition, police can install tracking tools directly 
onto cars,91 although that is beginning to look downright old-fashioned. In 
the future, we can expect that people may even have tracking or 
identification devices installed directly into their bodies, as we already do 
for our pets.92 A Wisconsin tech company offered to install chips in 
employees so they could easily enter the building and pay for cafeteria food 
with a wave of the hand, and a majority of the employees voluntarily got the 
chip.93   
2. The Technology of What We Are or Were Thinking 
The technology discussed above is amazing, but pales in comparison to 
potentially using technology to get into peoples’ brains. Imagine the 
implications for dispute resolution if we can figure out what people are 
thinking or remembering, or whether they were under the influence of drugs 
or alcohol.94 First, getting into peoples’ memories could give us an indirect 
                                                                                                                     
7:51 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/baltimore-police-stingray-cell-
surveillance/31994181/. 
88 In Carpenter v. United States, a five-to-four Supreme Court recently held that a warrant is needed 
to access cell phone site location information. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018). 
89 Kate Briquelet, My Fitbit Proves I Didn’t Kill Her, DAILY BEAST (June 6, 2017, 8:50 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/my-fitbit-proves-i-didnt-kill-her.  
90 Kevin Maney, Busted by Your Fitbit: How Smart Devices Can Solve Crimes, NEWSWEEK (May 
13, 2017, 10:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/26/fitbit-smart-technology-smart-devices-
crime-true-crime-amazon-echo-google-home-608410.html (giving examples of how fitness technology 
that tracks movements can be used to solve crimes and confirm or disprove alibis).  
91 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that police installation of a tracking 
device on a car is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, thereby requiring police to obtain a warrant 
prior to installation). 
92 Microchipping of Animals FAQ, AVMA, 
https://www.avma.org/KB/Resources/FAQs/Pages/Microchipping-of-animals-FAQ.aspx (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2019).  
93 Maggie Astor, Microchip Implants for Employees? One Company Says Yes, N.Y. TIMES (July 
25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/technology/microchips-wisconsin-company-
employees.html. 
94 See, e.g., Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1274–88 (2012) 
(discussing how neuroscience and other means can be used to identify an unknown person and to 
determine whether that person was under the influence of drugs or alcohol). Of course, the mere fact that 
brain science can yield certain technical information does not mean that the use would be permitted by 
law, including the U.S. Constitution. See Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
351, 400–07 (2012) (discussing how the use of such technical information could create Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment issues). 
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way to find out what actually happened.95 Perhaps this testing could even 
reveal information that the witness or perpetrator does not consciously 
remember or does not wish to reveal. Second, perhaps we could uncover 
information regarding state of mind and intent, such as whether a person 
acted knowingly, intentionally,96 reasonably,97 or maliciously,98 or the extent 
to which a person suffered pain.99 While we cannot yet insert electrodes or 
use other devices to learn exactly what is in someone’s brain, we are getting 
closer to that point, for better or for worse.   
i. Technology That Indirectly Measures What People Are 
Thinking 
Invented in 1921 by John Augustus Larson,100 polygraph machines do 
not tap directly into the subject’s brain, but rather measure physiological 
responses such as blood pressure, pulse, and respiration on the theory that 
giving false answers will cause the needle to move on these measures.101 The 
accuracy of the polygraph has been hotly contested, as many contend that 
nervous but honest subjects may incorrectly be found to be lying102 and that 
                                                                                                                     
95 Of course, to the extent we will be trying to use technology to access information from human 
brains, we will need to deal with what computer programmers call the issue of “garbage in, garbage out.” 
See Garbage In, Garbage Out, FREE DICTIONARY, 
https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/garbage+in%2C+garbage+out (last visited Aug. 29, 2019). If 
observer O thought they saw A kill B, they may remember A killed B. Yet, while the memory may be 
clear, O’s initial perception may have been erroneous. And, even if O’s initial perception was accurate, 
maybe O’s memory was not perfect or has become tainted. 
96 On the criminal side, we generally require evidence of intent of crimes such as murder or theft or 
battery. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). Civilly, intent can be relevant to prove 
discrimination or fraud. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that 
discrimination claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause require a showing of intent).  
97 Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the American 
Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL 
ISSUES 2010, at 203, 228 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011). But see Richard Restak, The Fiction of the 
‘Reasonable Man’, WASH. POST (May 17, 1987), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1987/05/17/the-law-the-fiction-of-the-reasonable-
man/15dea8f3-521a-48d0-aba8-9e361774450e/?utm_term=.204d92d76957 (discussing that due to the 
nature of our neurological structures, the “reasonableness” standard is unrealistic).  
98 “Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s 
evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
908(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
99 See, e.g., Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates 
Moral Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801, 811 (2012). 
100 NATHAN J. GORDON, ESSENTIALS OF POLYGRAPH AND POLYGRAPH TESTING 15 (2017).  
101 Id.  
102 Scott Lilienfeld, The Polygraph Test Strikes – and Strikes Out – Again, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 
21, 2009), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-skeptical-psychologist/200907/the-
polygraph-test-strikes-and-strikes-out-again.  
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cool liars can fool the test.103 As a result, polygraph results have been heavily 
critiqued and are often not admissible in court.104   
Efforts are under way to try to improve on the polygraph using other 
tools that would also, indirectly, try to determine what someone is thinking. 
For example, one company has been developing software intended to detect 
lies by tracing eye movements.105 Other companies are exploring whether 
voice recognition,106 analysis of facial expressions,107 or measurements of 
body twitches108 may provide better insight into truthfulness. Some suggest 
we are even getting to the point where robots can be used to measure 
subjects’ truthfulness.109 While it seems unlikely any of these tools will give 
completely reliable insights into subjects’ honesty, at least they give us a 
sense where the science is heading. 
ii. Tap Directly into the Brain??? 
Scientists are also beginning to develop tools to try to tap directly into 
someone’s brain, to see what the person is thinking or what they 
                                                                                                                     
103 See, e.g., DOUG WILLIAMS, HOW TO STING THE POLYGRAPH 2 (2014) (ebook), 
https://ia600207.us.archive.org/29/items/WilliamsDougHowToStingThePolygraph/Williams%2C_Dou
g_-_How_to_Sting_the_Polygraph.pdf (discussing how to “beat[]” a polygraph test). The author Doug 
Williams, a former police officer and polygraph examiner, served two years in jail for obstruction of 
justice and mail fraud connected to his business of training people how to pass polygraph exams. See 
Christina Sterbenz, This Ex-Cop Thinks Lie-Detector Tests Are So Inaccurate He’s Facing 100 Years in 
Prison for Starting a Website That Taught People How to Cheat Them, BUS. INSIDER (May 18, 2015), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-crazy-story-of-an-ex-cop-who-ran-a-website-that-taught-people-
how-to-cheat-polygraphs-2015-5; see also Mr. Lie Detector, THIS AM. LIFE (June 9, 2017), 
https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/618/mr-lie-detector.  
104 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 317 (1998) (finding that excluding the evidentiary 
admission of polygraph results did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights); Michael Stockdale 
& Don Grubin, The Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in English Criminal Proceedings, 76 J. CRIM. 
L. 232, 232 (2012) (discussing that while English and Commonwealth authority tend to find polygraph 
evidence is inadmissible, the issue has not yet been decided by the English Court of Appeal).  
105 Univ. of Utah, ‘You Can’t Hide Your Lyin’ Eyes’: Eye-Tracking Lie-Detection, PHYS.ORG (July 
12, 2010), https://phys.org/news/2010-07-lyin-eyes-eye-tracking-lie-detection.html.  
106 Susan Miller, When Everybody Lies: Voice-Stress Analysis Tackles Lie Detection, GCN (Mar. 
18, 2014), https://gcn.com/articles/2014/03/18/voice-risk-analysis.aspx (discussing increasing use of 
Computer Voice Stress Analysis tests including in criminal investigations).  
107 Richard Gray, The App That Knows if You’re Lying: Online ‘Polygraph’ Uses Artificial 
Intelligence to Study Your Face for Subtle Signs You’re Being Deceitful, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 12, 2016), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3395651/The-robot-knows-lying-Polygraph-powered-
artificial-intelligence-studies-face-voice-subtle-signs-deceitful.html.  
108 Ewen MacAskill, British and Dutch Researchers Develop New Form of Lie-Detector Test, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2015 12:16 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/jan/04/british-dutch-
researchers-new-form-lie-detector-test-polygraph.  
109 See June Javelosa, New Lie-Detecting Robot Security Agent Could Help Secure Borders, 
FUTURISM (Jan. 6, 2017), https://futurism.com/new-lie-detecting-robot-security-agent-could-help-
secure-borders/ (providing information on the Automated Virtual Agent for Truth Assessments in Real 
Time (AVATAR) and its ability to identify signs of lying and discomfort in travelers at borders using 
eye-detection software and motion and pressure sensors).  
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remember.110 The best known such tool is currently the fMRI—functional 
magnetic resonance imaging—a tool that “measures small and variable 
changes in the ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated blood in the brain when 
a particular task is performed or stimulus presented.”111 While the fMRI does 
not directly reveal thoughts or memories, some have suggested that it can 
effectively be used to measure whether someone is telling the truth. For 
example, a person can be shown pictures or asked questions while electrodes 
are attached to their head to measure reactions. By looking at which areas of 
the brain “light up” due to a higher presence of oxygenated blood, scientists 
may hypothesize whether the subject was previously familiar with a certain 
picture or words and whether or not the subject is lying when they make 
certain statements.112 Moreover, some researchers are even trying to compile 
what one commentator has called a “dictionary” of sorts for individual 
subjects, using fMRI technology to determine what the subject was thinking 
about at the time they were tested.113 Advocates of this new technology 
contend that it is more reliable than polygraphs because brain waves and 
cerebral blood flow are arguably less subject to control than blood pressure 
and heart rate.114 While both courts and scientists have generally agreed that 
the probative value of the fMRI is not yet sufficient to allow its use in 
court,115 one can foresee a day when such technology might contribute to 
dispute resolution. 
                                                                                                                     
110 See generally The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience, VAND. 
U., www.lawneuro.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2019), a website created by The MacArthur Foundation 
Research Network on Law and Neuroscience.  
111 Anthony D. Wagner et al., fMRI and Lie Detection: A Knowledge Brief of the MacArthur 
Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience 1 (Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 17-10, 
2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2881586. See generally Stacey Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and 
the Law: Trends and Directions for Future Scholarship, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44, 44–56 (2007) (discussing 
the use of neuroimaging and the law).  
112 Wagner et al., supra note 111, at 1.  
113 For example, fMRI studies have been done to try to determine which of several images the 
person was thinking about, or which of several videos they had watched. MARC JONATHAN BLITZ, 
SEARCHING MINDS BY SCANNING BRAINS: NEUROSCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRIVACY PROTECTION 56–57 (2017).  
114 Mark Peplow, Brain Imaging Could Spot Liars, NATURE (Nov. 29, 2004), 
https://www.nature.com/news/2004/041129/full/news041129-1.html.  
115 For example, in United States v. Semrau, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district 
court did not err in failing to admit fMRI expert testimony the defense sought to introduce to prove the 
defendant was telling the truth. 693 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Michael Laris, Debate on 
Brain Scans as Lie Detectors Highlighted in Maryland Murder Trial, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/debate-on-brain-scans-as-lie-detectors-highlighted-in-
maryland-murder-trial/2012/08/26/aba3d7d8-ed84-11e1-9ddc-340d5efb1e9c_story.html (discussing 
murder case, State v. Smith, in which a Maryland judge refused to admit fMRI evidence defense counsel 
claimed should prove their client was being truthful); Alexis Madrigal, Brain Scan Evidence Rejected by 
Brooklyn Court, WIRED (May 5, 2010, 5:08 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/05/fmri-in-court-update/ 
(explaining the court’s exclusion of fMRI evidence in an employer-retaliation case).  
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 Another form of brain technology, sometimes referred to as “brain 
fingerprinting,”116 may be even more promising. This technique studies 
brain waves emitted when persons are exposed to certain familiar stimuli, 
such as images that would be known only to a guilty person.117 Thus, rather 
than directly testing whether a person is telling the truth, it aims to determine 
whether the subject is familiar with certain information that would be known 
only to the perpetrator.118 For example, in the Steven Avery case, made 
famous in the Making a Murderer television documentary,119 Dr. Larry 
Farwell opined based on this test that Mr. Avery did not know specific 
information regarding where the victim was killed.120 Dr. Farwell claims that 
the technology has successfully been used both to convict a serial killer121 
and to free a man who had been wrongfully convicted.122 However, as with 
the fMRI, “brain fingerprinting” is not yet generally accepted by either 
courts or researchers.123 
Other brain-reading technology exists as well. A tool called functional 
near infrared imaging (fNIR) produces maps of brain activity similar to those 
produced by the fMRI, but without having to place the subject in a tubular 
                                                                                                                     
116 See generally Larry Farwell, Brain Fingerprinting: Detection of Concealed Information, in 
WILEY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCE (A. Jamieson & A.A. Moenssens eds., 2014). 
117 The technique, also known as a “concealed information” or “guilty knowledge” test, MARC 
JONATHAN BLITZ, SEARCHING MINDS BY SCANNING BRAINS: NEUROSCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTION 48–49 (2017), relies on electroencephalography (EEG) to 
measures subjects’ responses using a P300—a particular measurable brainwave. See Alexandra J. 
Roberts, Everything New is Old Again: Brain Fingerprinting and Evidentiary Analogy, 9 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 234, 260–64 (2007) (describing author’s personal experience being tested by Dr. Farwell). Dr. 
Farwell’s later research shows that the P300 is a piece of a larger response, which he labeled MERMER–
Memory and Encoding Related Multifaceted Electroencephalography. Id. at 260.  
118 Dr. Larry Farwell claims to have invented this technology. See Larry Farwell, Farwell Brain 
Fingerprinting: A New Paradigm in Criminal Justice and Counterterrorism, FARWELL BRAIN 
FINGERPRINTING, https://larryfarwell.com/brain-fingerprinting-executive-summary-dr-larry-farwell-dr-
lawrence-farwell.html (last visited July 28, 2018). But others have also been exploring the use of P300 
brainwaves to provide an alternative to the polygraph. Virginia Hughes, The Other Polygraph, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 30, 2014), http://phenomena.nationalgeographic.com/2014/09/30/the-other-
polygraph/. 
119 Making a Murderer (Netflix 2015). 
120 Notice of Motion & Motion for Post-Conviction Relief Pursuant to Wis. Stat. 974.06 & 805.15 
at 144–55, Wisconsin v. Avery, No. 05-CF-1381 (Wis. Ct. App. June 17, 2017). 
121 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Farwell et al., Brain Fingerprinting Field Studies Comparing P300-
MERMER and P300 Brainwave Responses in the Detection of Concealed Information, 7 COGNITIVE 
NEURODYNAMICS 263, 263 (2013); see also Roberts, supra note 117, at 257–64.  
122 For a detailed discussion of the case, see Roberts, supra note 117, at 264–65 (explaining that 
after testing confirmed defendant’s version of events, the primary prosecution witness recanted his 
testimony).   
123 See, e.g., Lyn M. Gaudet, Note, Brain Fingerprinting, Scientific Evidence, and Daubert: A 
Cautionary Lesson from India, 51 JURIMETRICS J. 293, 306 (2011) (commenting on the fact that fMRIs 
are not generally accepted by courts or researchers).  
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scanner.124 Also, electroencephalography (EEG) technology has been used 
for many years to measure rhythms of electrical brain activity, and perhaps 
may advance to yield more specific information.125 Additional potential 
tools include Positron Emission Tomography and Singe Photon Emission 
Computer Tomography scanning, which also measure blood flow in the 
brain.126 
In short, while we are not yet able to tap directly into brains to pull out 
memories or intentions, it does seem clear that we are on this road and that 
neurologists will increasingly be called upon to help resolve legal disputes. 
We can also be confident that many technical,127 legal,128 and 
philosophical129 issues will be raised as to the evidentiary use of neurological 
findings. For the purposes of this Article, however, the most significant 
issues are the extent to which we can solve legal conundrums by obtaining 
information from technological sources, the limits of the technology, and 
how these technological advances should affect our dispute resolution 
system. We now turn to these questions.  
                                                                                                                     
124 BLITZ, supra note 117, at 4 (citing Hasan Ayaz et al., Using Maze Suite and Functional Near 
Infrared Spectroscopy to Study Learning in Spatial Navigation, 56 J. VISUALIZED EXPERIMENTS 1, 1 
(2011)).  
125 Id. at 4–5, 45–55. 
126 Id. at 54–55; see also MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW: 
THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE xxii–xxv (2013) (briefly explaining 
MRI, fMRI, EEG, and other neuroscience technology).   
127 See, e.g., Daniel D. Langleben & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Using Brain Imaging for Lie 
Detection: Where Science, Law and Policy Collide, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 222, 222 (2013) 
(discussing how science needs to advance to support reliability of fMRI results); Frederick Schauer, Can 
Bad Science be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 
1192 (2010) (suggesting that scientific results that do not meet scientists’ criteria for reliability may 
nonetheless be appropriate to admit at trial in certain situations).  
128 Regarding potential constitutional issues, see, e.g., BLITZ, supra note 117, at 59–60 (discussing 
neuroimaging and the Fifth Amendment); Dov Fox, Will Memory Detection Technology Transform 
Criminal Justice in the U.S.? Brain Imaging and the Bill of Rights, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2008) 
(examining Fourth and Fifth Amendment implications of admitting neuroscience evidence); Francis X. 
Shen, Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 692–707 (2013) 
(same). 
129 See generally 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, DISEASE, 
AND DEVELOPMENT (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008) (discussing topics including “Internalism and 
the Evidence form Pathology”); PARDO & PATTERSON, supra note 126, at 179–207 (discussing 
implications of neuroscience for theories of criminal punishment); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on 
the Stand, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 11, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html (discussing the philosophy behind 
using neuroscience in the American legal system).  
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II. NOT SO QUICK—OUR NEW TECHNOLOGY WILL NOT NECESSARILY 
BRING US TRUTH OR JUSTICE 
A. New Technology Will Not Bring Us Indisputable Truth 
1. Challenges to Recording and Presenting the Truth 
The science outlined above is amazing, but it will never deliver an 
indisputable truth, even if such truth exists. First, as a matter of logistics, it 
is difficult to imagine a world in which our technology will be so 
ever-present that it delivers information on all issues. Even if we were to 
have cameras virtually everywhere; collect everyone’s fingerprints, retinal 
scans, and DNA; track everyone’s phones and computers; and tap into 
everyone’s brain, some event might be missed or incorrectly recorded.   
Second, even to the extent that technology records an event or evaluates 
a brain, it will not resolve all issues.130 In fact, in 2009 the National Academy 
of Science published a study showing that forensic sciences, for the most 
part, were not reliable.131 The study found that while DNA analyses could 
be quite effective, other popular tests including fingerprints, hair, and bullets 
often were not valid.132 One fundamental problem is that despite popular 
belief, even fingerprints and retinal scans have not been proven to be unique, 
much less bullet traces or footprints. As several commentators have 
suggested, excepting DNA, “[a]lthough individualization is the centerpiece 
of numerous forensic science subfields, . . . no theoretical or empirical basis 
for individualization exists, and none is likely to come into being in the 
foreseeable future.”133 Further, although analysts have found that DNA 
                                                                                                                     
130 See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Daubert’s Failure, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 869, 
869 (2018) (questioning courts’ ability to figure out which technology works and suggesting the use of 
an independent commission to aid courts in this endeavor); Jonathan J. Koehler, How Trial Judges Should 
Think About Forensic Science Evidence, 102 JUDICATURE 28, 36 (2018) (urging that there are compelling 
reasons to be concerned about the quality of many categories of forensic evidence and that courts are 
failing to adequately evaluate and deal with these problems).  
131 COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 87 (2009); see also 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 
142 (2016) (offering trial judges guidance on how to determine the scientific reliability of proffered 
forensic evidence).  
132 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra 
note 131, at 67–123. Indeed, the 2009 National Academy of Science Report leads one to question whether 
these familiar types of evidence comply with the evidentiary standards set out by the Supreme Court in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring judges to determine 
whether expert evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admissible). 
133 Saks & Faigman, Failed Forensics, supra note 37, at 154–56. We have also seen that some of 
our technology may be more effective at identifying white men than women or members of other racial 
or ethnic groups. See, e.g., Joy Buolamwini, When the Robot Doesn’t See Dark Skin, N.Y. TIMES (June 
21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/opinion/facial-analysis-technology-bias.html 
(describing gender and racial bias demonstrated in tests of facial analysis technology); Steve Lohr, Facial 
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forensics has the potential to be much more accurate than the other 
methods,134 it is also clear that mistakes can be made in DNA testing thereby 
leading to serious errors.135 At most, DNA can deliver results within certain 
probabilistic ranges, but false negatives and false positives are always 
possible.136 Moreover, one recent study even showed that a person’s DNA 
could be changed by giving that person a bone marrow transplant.137  
Third, evidence can be faked, whether by prosecutors, investigators, or 
other parties.138 DNA or bacteria can be planted139 or improperly analyzed,140 
videos, audio, and photos can be altered,141 and presumably even brain scans 
                                                                                                                     
Recognition is Accurate, if You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html 
(noting problem Google faced in 2015 when its image-recognition photo app labeled African Americans 
as gorillas). 
134 E.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 37, at 47. 
135 The National Research Council has twice done in-depth studies on DNA testing and laboratory 
procedures, resulting in a series of recommendations to put in place protocols and procedures to ensure 
that the science is used properly. See Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic 
Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893, 965–66 (2008) (discussing research of 
the National Research Council); see also Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: 
The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 187–91, 208–20 (2007) (discussing serious 
lapses in Houston DNA lab while also generally noting that DNA can be far more reliable than other 
forms of forensic science and is now often effectively regulated).   
136 See, e.g., Marina Medvin, Framed by Your Own Cells: How DNA Evidence Imprisons the 
Innocent, FORBES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marinamedvin/2018/09/20/framed-by-
your-own-cells-how-dna-evidence-imprisons-the-innocent/#582b985a4b86 (explaining how DNA 
evidence can be used against innocent people).  
137 Heather Murphy, When a DNA Test Says You’re a Younger Man, Who Lives 5,000 Miles Away, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/07/us/dna-bone-marrow-transplant-
crime-lab.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share. 
138 As will be discussed, investigators may also inadvertently misinterpret scientific evidence. See 
infra text accompanying notes 178–82.  
139 See, e.g., Caitlin Flynn, Did Mark Fuhrman Plant Evidence in the O.J. Simpson Case? He 
Evoked the Fifth Amendment in Court, BUSTLE (Mar. 29, 2016), 
https://www.bustle.com/articles/150655-did-mark-fuhrman-plant-evidence-in-the-oj-simpson-case-he-
evoked-the-fifth-amendment-in (discussing whether Mark Fuhrman planted the infamous white glove in 
the O.J. Simpson case); Julia Jacobo, Baltimore Police Sergeant Planted Drugs in Suspect’s Car, Federal 
Prosecutors Say, ABC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/US/baltimore-police-sergeant-
planted-drugs-suspects-car-federal/story?id=51492675 (reporting on a Baltimore police officer’s 
indictment for planting heroin in a car). The Making a Murderer Netflix series also included an allegation 
that the police had removed blood from a syringe in the evidence locker and then used that blood to try 
to implicate defendant Steven Avery. Making a Murderer: Indefensible (Netflix 2015).  
140 See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, and Expert Witnesses, 
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1493, 1500–01 (2007) (discussing work of prosecution expert whose remarkable 
ability to secure convictions was apparently based on improper science). 
141 In 2018, the Trump White House was accused of putting out a video that had allegedly been 
tampered with to justify revoking the press credentials of CNN reporter Jim Acosta. Drew Harwell, White 
House Shares Doctored Video to Support Punishment of Journalist Jim Acosta, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/11/08/white-house-shares-doctored-video-
support-punishment-journalist-jim-acosta. As well, a faked video of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was 
slowed down to make her appear drunk. Drew Harwell, Faked Pelosi Videos, Slowed to Make Her Appear 
Drunk, Spread Across Social Media, WASH. POST (May 24, 2019), 
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can be tampered with. While technical means may be devised to try to guard 
against or detect such chicanery,142 it seems that at least historically human 
ingenuity and capacity for deception have inevitably found ways to thrive.   
Fourth, even with the most impressive technology, superior wealth and 
advocacy will likely make a difference. As Marc Galanter explained many 
years ago, it seems that the “haves” always come out ahead.143 This will 
remain true in our future more heavily technological world in both the civil 
and criminal context.144 Wealthier disputants will have greater access to 
technology, and those with more resources will be able to hire superior 
advocates and better experts, and thereby better protect their interests.145   
Finally, as is discussed below, it is not possible to consider technological 
evidence without also raising psychological and even philosophical 
concerns. Our science, good as it may become, will never stand 
independently from the humans who both create the technology and then 
interpret the results.146 Yet, we humans will inevitably bring to bear our 
                                                                                                                     
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/23/faked-pelosi-videos-slowed-make-her-
appear-drunk-spread-across-social-media. One new tool is Adobe’s Project VoCo, software being 
developed to allow for the manipulation of video and audio. Zeyu Jin et al., VoCo: Text-based Insertion 
and Replacement in Audio Narration, 36 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON GRAPHICS 1, 1 (2017). This 
technology essentially allows for the equivalent of “photoshopping” of audios and videos—substituting 
in new words and even actions. See, e.g., Kevin Roose, Here Come the Fake Videos, Too, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/04/technology/fake-videos-deepfakes.html 
(explaining how videos can be altered); Olivia Solon, The Future of Fake News: Don’t Believe 
Everything You Read, See or Hear, GUARDIAN (July 26, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/26/fake-news-obama-video-trump-face2face-
doctored-content (explaining how content can be altered).  
142 Seeing Isn’t Believing: The Fact Checker’s Guide to Manipulated Video, WASH. POST, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/politics/fact-checker/manipulated-video-
guide/?wpisrc=nl_most&wpmm=1 (last visited Jan. 6, 2020). 
143 Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 
9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 124–25 (1974); see also WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH 62 (1998) 
(stating that our justice system tends to favor “sophisticated or wealthy suspects”). 
144 See Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth, 56 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 911, 914 (2011–12) (discussing that prosecutors often prevail simply because they have 
more resources); Findley, Innocents at Risk, supra note 135, at 898 (stating that defendants tend to be 
disadvantaged by disparities and imbalances between parties with regard to discovery, ability, access to 
resources, etc.). 
145 See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 81 
(Princeton Univ. Press 1973) (1949) (observing that “frequently the partisanship of the opposing lawyers 
blocks the uncovering of vital evidence or . . . distorts it”); Frankel, supra note 13, at 1052 (contending 
that the adversary system places too much emphasis on contentiousness and too little on truth); see also 
PIZZI, supra note 143, at 25–45, 140–54 (urging that we focus too much on procedural rights and not 
enough on defendants’ access to adequate representation). 
146 ADAM BENFORADO, UNFAIR: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CRIMINAL INJUSTICE, at xvii–xx (2015) 
(explaining how the psychology of decision making too often contaminates our criminal investigative 
systems); DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 1–8 (2012) 
(explaining why current investigative techniques such as interviews, confessions, and lineups are so 
prone to produce erroneous results). 
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human psyches and biases. Moreover, we must consider the serious question 
of what it means to find “truth.” 
2. But Is There Really a Truth? 
Many twentieth century scholars from disciplines such as philosophy, 
linguistics, sociology, and psychology have urged that truth-finding is 
rooted inevitably in our own subjectivity. As noted legal scholar Mirjan 
Damaška has explained, such philosophical and psychological critiques pose 
problems for any system of justice aimed at discovering the truth, and 
particularly for trials: 
One of the working assumptions of the practice of adjudication 
is that truth is in principle discoverable, and that accuracy in 
fact-finding constitutes a precondition for a just decision. But 
influential currents of contemporary thought are skeptical of 
truth as a philosophical principle, and they doubt that the 
acquisition of objective knowledge is possible.147 
As co-author of a book on lawyering and psychology,148 I appreciate that 
even the most seemingly objective facts are subject to challenge from a 
psychological perspective. Humans are inevitably influenced by our prior 
knowledge and cannot help but perceive,149 remember,150 and process151 new 
information in light of that which is already stored within our brains.152 
When the internet almost blew up because people were disputing whether a 
dress was white or blue,153 or whether a voice had said “yanny” or 
“laurel,”154 we saw that things that are obviously true to us may not be 
                                                                                                                     
147 Mirjan Damaška, Truth in Adjudication, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 289, 289 (1998). Damaška discusses, 
for example, the post-modernist views of Hayden White, the social construction theories of John Searle, 
“coherence theory,” “correspondence” theory, and “convergence” theory. Id. at 290–93; see also Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 5, 14 (1996) (discussing philosophers, literary critics, art critics, feminist theorists, 
linguistics, and others who have questioned existence of a knowable stable truth and arguing that the 
non-adversarial approaches may be best in a world where truth is unknowable).  
148 See generally JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: 
UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING (2012) 
(urging lawyers to draw on cognitive and social psychology to represent their clients more effectively). 
149 Id. at 7–27 (discussing psychology of perception).  
150 Id. at 29–43 (discussing psychology of memory). 
151 Id. at 67–83 (discussing psychology of judgment).  
152 Id. at 34 (discussing that our memory is colored by information we already have in our minds).  
153 Jonathan Corum, Is That Dress White and Gold or Blue and Black?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/02/28/science/white-or-bluedress.html.  
154 Rachel Gutman, A Linguist Explains Why ‘Laurel’ Sounds Like ‘Yanny’, ATLANTIC (May 15, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/05/dont-rest-on-your-laurels/560483/. 
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obviously true to others. Thus, there is great reason to believe that advocates, 
investigators, and neutrals may all fall prey to preexisting biases.155  
One human error that frequently comes into play is “confirmation 
bias”—also called “tunnel vision”156 or more generally, “observer bias.”157 
As commentator Michael Risinger puts it, “[a]n elementary principle of 
modern psychology is that the desires and expectations people possess 
influence their perceptions and interpretations of what they observe.”158 
Such preconceptions frequently connect to racial and ethnic biases, such as 
when (as was recently reported) security guards assumed that an African 
American woman could not possibly belong in a Yale dorm lounge.159 
Nonetheless, while I appreciate that truth is both elusive and often 
illusory, I am not ready to reject the truth-finding quest altogether. Socially 
constructed as our world may be, I am still confident we can at least 
sometimes find that a light was either red or green at a particular moment in 
time, that Person A did or did not stab Person B, or even that a product did 
or did not comply with relevant design criteria.160 That is, I share Mirjan 
Damaška’s conclusion that it is appropriate to search for truth in the legal 
context, even while recognizing the challenges. He states, “the cultivation 
of truth-values remains important for all adjudication,”161 explaining that 
even though adjudicators may not be able to acquire objective knowledge 
                                                                                                                     
155 See, e.g., Mirjan Damaška, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1083, 1092–1106 (1975) (discussing psychological factors likely to lead both lawyer advocates and 
judges to stray from the truth); Dan Simon et al., Adversarial and Non-Adversarial Investigations: An 
Experiment 17 (May 15, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1401723 (finding, 
in experiment, that assigning person to role, whether as attorney or as investigator, significantly impacted 
their perspective on disputed “facts”).  
156 Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal 
Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 292–95 (2006); see also Kent Roach, Forensic Science and Miscarriages 
of Justice: Some Lessons from a Comparative Experience, 50 JURIMETRICS 67, 81–82 (2009) (discussing 
need to insulate crime labs from dangers of confirmation bias). 
157 D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic 
Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13 n.52 (2002). 
158 Id. at 6.   
159 Christina Caron, A Black Yale Student Was Napping, and a White Student Called the Police, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/nyregion/yale-black-student-
nap.html. Scientists in a variety of fields have recognized the existence of such biases, and some have 
endeavored to structure their own research to correct for such preconceptions. Risinger et al., supra note 
157, at 8 (discussing observer effects in various scientific fields including in the work of Isaac Newton 
and Gregor Mendel). 
160 Cf. Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System, supra note 147, at 17–18 (pointing 
out that a single truth is hardest to find for disputes that are complex and polycentric rather than binary 
in nature). 
161 Damaška, Truth in Adjudication, supra note 147, at 289–90 (“[W]hile ‘post-modern’ thought 
may be usefully unsettling for some intellectual pursuits, it is of little use in evidence law.”). 
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independent of human beliefs, they only need “to establish events and 
phenomena in the socially created world.”162   
The implications of this perspective for the new technology discussed in 
this Article are nuanced. Given human frailties, we want our new technology 
to help us contend with some of the truth-finding problems that are inherent 
in human perception, memory, and analysis. Yet, whether we are 
considering photos, videos, retinal scans, DNA, or any other technology, it 
turns out that the science does not “speak for itself.” Rather, investigators, 
judges, jurors, mediators, or members of the community are all human, and 
thus view, process, and remember information, technological or not, through 
human filters. We cannot use technology to escape human subjectivity after 
all.163   
Indeed, the fact that technology may seem to reveal a single truth is more 
dangerous than the problems we faced in earlier times, when we were more 
obviously dependent on flawed evidence such as eyewitness testimony. We 
tend to trust our eyes and our ears.164 Yet, as Supreme Court Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo put the matter: “We may try to see things as objectively 
as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes except our 
own.”165 So, the technology lures us with apparent objectivity but can never 
deliver on that promise.  
Several recent controversies show how human psychology has impacted 
the interpretation of seemingly indisputable video evidence. In Scott v. 
Harris, eight Supreme Court Justices famously relied on their own viewing 
of a police dash cam video of a car chase to conclude that the plaintiff could 
not possibly prevail on his claim that the police used excessive force.166 
Indeed, Justice Scalia wrote in the majority opinion, “[w]e are happy to 
allow the videotape to speak for itself.”167 However, Supreme Court Justice 
                                                                                                                     
162 Id. at 292. See also PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 13 (1966) (distinguishing reality from 
knowledge); JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 1–2 (1995) (distinguishing 
“brute” facts such as the existence of Mt. Everest from “institutional” or socially constructed facts such 
as the existence of money). 
163 See SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 146, at 2 (“One of the obvious features of the criminal justice 
process is that it is operationalized mostly through people: witnesses, detectives, suspects, lawyers, 
judges, and jurors.”). 
164 See generally NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 8 (2009) (discussing perceived objectivity 
and impartiality of images); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 683, 689–92 (2012) (discussing the seductive power of images, in that they seem pure 
but nonetheless frame worldviews). 
165 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 1 J.L. 329, 331 (2011). See also Itiel 
E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 
156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 74 (2006) (arguing that forensic science fields are not as objective as they 
should be). 
166 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374, 378–81, 386 (2007).  
167 Id. at 378 n.5. 
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Stevens watched the same video and came to a different conclusion, as did 
the district court judge and three judges on the court of appeals.168 Inspired 
by the Justices’ disparate views, and Justice Scalia’s assertion that the video 
spoke for itself, researchers conducted a study looking at how 1350 people 
of diverse backgrounds would view the video at issue in Scott v. Harris.169 
They found that “members of various subcommunities” tended to view the 
facts differently than had the eight Justices.170 Specifically, 
“African-Americans, low-income workers and residents of the Northeast . . 
. tended to form more pro-plaintiff views of the facts than did the Court,” as 
did “individuals who characterized themselves as liberals and 
Democrats.”171 While we may not be able to say one group is more “right” 
than the other, studies like these show that perception and cognition can be 
“motivated” by one’s prior beliefs and experiences.172 
One does not need to look far to find additional real-world examples of 
this same phenomenon. Viewing video of a demonstration at the Lincoln 
Memorial in 2019, some saw white high school students disrespect a Native 
American elder and others saw the white high school students being 
disrespected by other protesters.173 In other examples, did a police body cam 
video show that the minority group member engaged in a threatening 
gesture?174 Did footage of the demonstrations in Charleston, South Carolina 
                                                                                                                     
168 Id. at 389. Justice Stevens opined that he viewed the video differently because he had more 
experience than the other Justices driving on country roads. Id. at 390 n.1. 
169 Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of 
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 854 (2009). 
170 Id. at 841. 
171 Id. 
172 See also Howard M. Wasserman, Mixed Signals on Summary Judgment, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1331, 1337 (“[V]ideo cannot, as Scott insisted and Plumhoff assumed, speak for itself. What video 
actually says depends on a number of different considerations—who and what is depicted, who created 
the images, and details of the images themselves (such as length, clarity, lighting, distance, angle, scope, 
steadiness, quality).”). In the laboratory, psychologists have performed many studies that show 
perception is linked to prior beliefs. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive 
Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 853 (2012) (explaining how a 
student’s loyalty to their institution shaped how they viewed and interpreted a video); Avani Mehta Sood 
& John M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm in the Service of Criminalization Goals, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 
1313, 1336, 1340 (2012) (discussing how personal beliefs influenced the participant’s reported 
perceptions). 
173 Michael Miller, A Tribal Elder and a High School Junior Stood Face to Face, and the World 
Reacted, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/a-tribal-elder-and-a-high-
school-junior-stood-face-to-face-and-the-world-reacted/ar-BBSwlbl. See also Christine Emba, What a 
Dead Samurai Can Teach Us About the Covington Controversy, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-a-dead-samurai-can-teach-us-about-the-covington-
controversy/2019/01/24/eeddee12-201d-11e9-8e21-59a09ff1e2a1_story.html?utm_term=.61aefa5aa3a3 
(describing how the incident can be viewed from four different perspectives). 
174 Timothy Williams et al., Police Body Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video.html (last updated Apr. 1, 
2016). See also Vivian Yee & Kirk Johnson, Body Cameras Worn by Police Officers are No ‘Safeguard 
of Truth,’ Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2014), 
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over removal of the Robert E. Lee statue show that protestors and 
counter-protestors engaged in similar acts of violence?175 Did a video of a 
purported confession show the confession was made voluntarily?176 
Opinions will be shaped by prior knowledge and opinions, the portion of 
video one watches, and the physical perspective from which the video is 
taken.177 
This same psychology impacts our review of other scientific evidence 
as well as videos. In 2004, the FBI was called-in to help solve a train 
bombing that had occurred in Madrid, Spain.178 Three expert FBI fingerprint 
analysts all erroneously confirmed that a partial print found on a plastic bag 
in a car containing bomb-related materials was a “100% match” for the print 
of Oregon attorney Brandon Mayfield, who happened to be Muslim.179 
Mayfield, whose prints were available because of his prior military service 
and an arrest years earlier,180 was detained for several weeks before he was 
ultimately released when Spanish authorities found the actual perpetrator, 
also using fingerprint evidence.181 Subsequent studies showed how and why 
the presumably well-meaning FBI agents fell prey to psychological biases, 
such as the confirmation bias discussed above, that led them to make 
significant mistakes.182 Researchers have identified many similar 
investigatory errors by a variety of investigative bodies.183   
                                                                                                                     
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/nyregion/body-cameras-worn-by-police-officers-are-no-
safeguard-of-truth-experts-say.html (stating that body camera footage is not always decisive).  
175 Jacey Fortin, The Statue at the Center of Charlottesville’s Storm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-rally-protest-statue.htm. 
176 G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Evaluating Videotaped Confessions: Expertise Provides No Defense 
Against the Camera-Perspective Effect, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 224, 224–26 (2007). 
177 FAN, supra note 52, at 15 (“How the camera is positioned, and how people are framed, can 
influence our perceptions of what is happening.”);  Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body 
Camera Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 948 (2017) (“While the camera seems to be an unbiased 
eye, camera perspective can powerfully shape viewer judgments . . . .”). 
178 Sarah Kershaw et al., Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 
2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/05/us/spain-and-us-at-odds-on-mistaken-terror-arrest.html. 
179 HARRIS, supra note 79, at 3–5.  
180 Id. at 3.   
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 3–5; Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and the Need to Regulate Crime Labs, supra note 
135, at 203–05, 221–22; Saks & Faigman, Failed Forensics, supra note 37, at 158. 
183 Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful 
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (finding that prosecution forensic experts had given invalid 
testimony, such as by misstating empirical data, in sixty percent of studied wrongful conviction cases). 
See generally Dan Simon, Minimizing Error and Bias in Death Investigations, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 
255, 255–58 (2019) (exploring the effect of confirmation bias on death investigations and proposing 
solutions).  
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B. Justice Involves More than Truth 
Although current U.S. commentators tend to emphasize the centrality of 
truth-finding to justice, systems of justice across time and around the world, 
have recognized that justice involves more than truth.  
1. Trials 
While trials, as discussed, focus substantially on truth,184 they also focus 
on many non-truth issues. For example, we use trials to determine 
appropriate remedies, provide disputants with procedural justice, educate the 
public, and consider a variety of monetary and non-monetary goals and 
costs.  
i. Remedies 
Even assuming the truth of an alleged crime or civil infraction were 
known, prosecutors, judges, jurors, or other decisionmakers would need to 
determine appropriate remedies. In criminal cases, remedial determinations 
may include consideration of historical truth, but inevitably also involve 
assessments of motive, emotion, predictions of future conduct, and state of 
mind. For example, as prosecutors offer plea bargains or propose sentences, 
they may consider what resolution would best help a wrongdoer reintegrate 
into society.185 Similarly, once a defendant is found guilty in a criminal trial, 
a sentencing judge typically considers such factors as the defendant’s prior 
criminal record, family history, state of mind, acceptance of responsibility, 
and potential positive contributions to society. These factors are typically 
considered relevant to sentencing,186 and to whether the defendant should be 
ordered or allowed to commence drug treatment or other programs.187 
Particularly given the problems and costs of mass incarceration,188 more and 
                                                                                                                     
184 See supra Section II.A. 
185 Julie A. Lumpkin, The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish That a Defendant Has 
Materially Breached A Plea Agreement, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1059, 1064 (1987) (explaining that plea 
bargaining facilitates rehabilitation).  
186 See, e.g., Andrea Avila, Consideration of Rehabilitative Factors for Sentencing in Federal 
Courts: Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011), 92 NEB. L. REV. 404, 405–10 (2013) (discussing 
the decline of the rehabilitative model of punishment and the implementation of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines); Kathleen Landis, Determinate Sentencing and the Rise of Alternative Sanctions: Does 
Shame Meet the Goals of Sentencing Reform?, 55 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 243, 256–63 (2017) (discussing 
factors that might lead a judge to impose community service rather than more conventional punishments). 
187 CYNTHIA ALKON & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME: PLEA BARGAINING, 
PROBLEM SOLVING, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT 275–406 (2019) (discussing 
problem solving courts and therapeutic justice).  
188 See, e.g., GREG BERMAN & JULIAN ADLER, START HERE: A ROAD MAP TO REDUCING MASS 
INCARCERATION 4–12 (2018) (discussing the “negative effects of incarceration” and how to lessen them); 
Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 431–36 (2013) (discussing 
the “[b]roader [h]arms of [m]ass [i]ncarceration”); see generally JACOB KANG-BROWN ET AL., THE NEW 
DYNAMICS OF MASS INCARCERATION (2018) (providing updated insights on the mass incarceration 
phenomenon). 
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more U.S. jurisdictions are beginning to implement programs, at least for 
minor crimes, that allow judges to take more creative approaches to 
sentencing.189 Sometimes these jurisdictions establish “problem solving 
courts” geared to reintegrate offenders back into the community190 after 
helping with underlying issues including drugs, mental health, and veterans’ 
experiences. These broader kinds of factors are also relevant as parole 
boards consider whether convicted jailed criminals should be released back 
into society.191  
With regard to civil remedies, judges and juries may sometimes consider 
whether an appropriate remedy is necessary not only to compensate a 
wronged plaintiff, but also to punish a defendant or deter other potential 
defendants from engaging in similar behavior.192 Remedies may involve 
monetary payments, but sometimes include non-monetary injunctions or 
declarations of law as well. Policy concerns, fairness, and morality often 
enter into such remedial determinations.193   
ii. Procedural Justice 
We also consider issues other than truth in trials to the extent we 
endeavor to provide what social psychologists have called “procedural 
justice.”194 Specifically, researchers have found that people greatly value 
being provided with an opportunity to voice their concerns, be treated with 
dignity, and have a perceived neutral third party consider their 
perspectives.195 While we generally focus on how best to provide procedural 
                                                                                                                     
189 See How Can America Reduce Mass Incarceration?, FRESH AIR PODCAST (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/06/636046653/how-can-america-reduce-mass-incarceration (discussion 
regarding “alternatives to jail, including community service, social services and even personal essays”). 
190 See, e.g., GREG BERMAN ET AL., GOOD COURTS: THE CASE FOR PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE 31–
33 (2005) (defining problem solving courts and describing their use); DOUGLAS B. MARLOWE ET AL., 
NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT ON DRUG COURTS 
AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2016) (reviewing problem solving 
courts); Jessica K. Steinberg, A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1579, 1580–
81 (2018) (discussing uses of problem solving courts). 
191 See Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by Parole 
Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 579–80 (1994) (discussing multiple factors considered in parole decisions). 
192 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (explaining that 
“[p]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing 
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition”). 
193 See generally MARTHA MINOW, WHEN SHOULD LAW FORGIVE? (2019) (discussing whether and 
when legal institutions and legal officials should promote forgiveness rather than punishment). 
194 See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 1–5 (1988); Paul G. Chevigny, Lind & Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Fairness, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1211 (1989) (book review).  
195 See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1975); Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE 
RESEARCH IN LAW 65 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001); Laurens Walker et al., Reactions 
of Participants and Observers to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 295 (1974). See 
generally Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution 
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justice to the immediate disputants, these same factors may sometimes lead 
us to allow victims or others to participate in trials as well, so they too can 
feel heard.196 Thus, even if technology provided the truth of what had 
happened, there would be other issues to consider in setting up trials. 
iii. Education and Communal Values 
Trials can also serve societal purposes, such as educating the public as 
to rules and values, forming or maintaining communal bonds, and allowing 
affected persons or community members to express their emotions. For 
example, one of the earliest trials that was written about, albeit mythical, 
involved Orestes’s killing of his mother, Clytemnestra.197 Orestes’s father, 
Agamemnon, had sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia and then abducted 
another woman, Cassandra, to become his concubine. Orestes’s mother, 
understandably displeased with this turn of events, killed Agamemnon when 
he returned home. Orestes then killed his mother to avenge her killing of his 
father, leaving the Gods to decide what should now happen to Orestes. 
Should he be punished for his act? To resolve the matter, the goddess Athena 
set up a trial at which Athenian citizens would decide Orestes’s fate.198 The 
purpose of this trial was not to ascertain truth or facts, which were known to 
all, but rather to decide whether the killing was justified. After much 
discussion, the jury split evenly, but Athena broke the tie by voting in favor 
of Orestes.199 By holding the trial in public, Athena hoped to calm those gods 
who had been angered by the killing, and the trial also served to air citizens’ 
concerns over the events.200  
                                                                                                                     
Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549 
(2008) (arguing that “courts should aim to gain greater clarity about disputants’ preferences, and work to 
deliberately implement those preferences”). Cf. Valerie Jenness & Kitty Calavita, “It Depends on the 
Outcome”: Prisoners, Grievances, and Perceptions of Justice, 52 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 41 (2018) (finding 
that men incarcerated in California prisons focus substantially on the outcome of disputes as their 
measure of justice). 
196 See, e.g., Scott Cacciola, Victims in Larry Nassar Abuse Case Find a Fierce Advocate: The 
Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/sports/larry-nassar-rosemarie-
aquilina-judge.html (discussing how trial judge allowed victims of Dr. Larry Nassar to tell their story in 
open court).  
197 Aeschylus famously described these events in his three-part play, Oresteia, which one author 
has called “the oldest known courtroom drama in history.” SADAKAT KADRI, THE TRIAL: A HISTORY, 
FROM SOCRATES TO O.J. SIMPSON 4 (2005). These mythical events are also discussed by Homer in The 
Odyssey, and by Euripides in his play, Orestes. See, e.g., 1 ROBERT J. BONNER & GERTRUDE SMITH, THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE FROM HOMER TO ARISTOTLE 125–29 (AMS Press 1970) (1930). For an 
excellent discussion of how justice is described in several Greek trials, see David Luban, Some Greek 
Trials: Order and Justice in Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus and Plato, 54 TENN. L. REV. 279 (1987).   
198 BONNER & SMITH, supra note 197, at 125–29; KADRI, supra note 197, at 4–5.   
199 Luban, supra note 197, at 295–96.   
200 Id. at 297 (explaining that Athena thought the public trial was necessary to appease the Furies 
and thereby protect the city).   
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For another illustration, we can look to medieval Europe, where it was 
fairly common to put animals and insects on trial for a variety of alleged 
misdeeds—including eating human crops, harming or killing humans, or 
having sexual relations with humans.201 One of the most famous of such 
trials involved felony charges brought against the rats of Autun, France, in 
1522.202 In that case, as in others, an attorney was appointed to represent the 
animals.203 Along similar lines, the Athenians even held trials for inanimate 
objects, such as stones or pieces of metal that caused harm to humans.204 
Clearly the purpose of such trials was neither to find the truth nor to deter 
animals, insects, or inanimate objects from misbehaving in the future. 
Rather, while the trials did reach real conclusions (such as killing the 
animals, dropping charges, or working out a settlement),205 presumably the 
purpose of these trials had more to do with their educational or emotional 
impact on human observers.206 More recently, we might consider the trial of 
sexual abuser Dr. Larry Nassar, from Michigan State, in which the judge 
allowed victims to directly confront their abuser.207 Again the point of the 
interaction was not mere truth-finding.  
Some other trials have served a more propagandist, educational, or 
communal purpose. At various points in history, throughout the world, 
powerful leaders have used “trials” to cement their victory over those they 
have vanquished. Whether one thinks of the trial of Louis XVI during the 
French Revolution,208 the Moscow “Show Trials,”209 or even the Nuremberg 
Trials, one can see that the pomp and circumstance of a trial is sometimes 
used for purposes different than ascertaining the truth. The Nuremberg trials 
of Nazi officers at the end of World War II were not primarily designed to 
                                                                                                                     
201 KADRI, supra note 197, at 146–58. See E.P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS 1–17 (3d prtg. 2000) (explaining multiple purposes of trying animals and 
insects including expurgation of evil spirits and protecting the community from future harms). 
202 William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was it Like to Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1889, 1898 (1995) (discussing charges brought against rats for “having eaten and wantonly 
destroyed some barley crops in the jurisdiction”).   
203 Attorney Barthelmy Chassenée argued his rat clients had not been provided with due notice of 
the proceedings and did not have adequate opportunity to make their appearance, due to plaintiffs’ cats. 
Id. at 1898–99. Other cases involving attacks by beetles or weevils on crops resulted in settlements, such 
as the setting aside of plots of land for the use of the insects. KADRI, supra note 197, at 146.  
204 Ewald, supra note 202, at 1912. 
205 See, e.g., id. at 1903–04 (quoting Shakespeare’s mention in The Merchant of Venice of a wolf 
“hanged for human slaughter” and also taking note of cows and pigs condemned to death).   
206 See id. at 1905 (“[W]hat needs to be explained is not why one would put down a dangerous cow, 
but why one would first bring the matter to the Law Faculty of Leipzig.”).  
207 Sophie Gilbert, The Transformative Justice of Judge Aquilina, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2018/01/judge-rosemarie-aquilina-larry-
nassar/551462/. Cf. Kelly Hayes & Mariame Kaba, The Sentencing of Larry Nassar Was Not 
‘Transformative Justice.’ Here’s Why, APPEAL (Feb. 5, 2018), https://theappeal.org/the-sentencing-of-
larry-nassar-was-not-transformative-justice-here-s-why-a2ea323a6645/. 
208 DAVID P. JORDAN, THE KING’S TRIAL: LOUIS XVI VS. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 44–45 (2004). 
209 KADRI, supra note 197, at 178 (discussing Moscow Show Trials). 
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find out what the officers had done, but rather to provide a venue in which 
the responsibility of the perpetrators of injustice could be explored, and 
through which the public could be educated.210 And, at the same time, these 
goals caused some to worry that the Nuremberg trials “might set an example 
of high politics masquerading as law.”211 
Whether high-minded or cynical, bringing together the community to 
discuss an important event may serve some purposes, including allowing 
community members to express their desires for vengeance or other 
emotions, to bond with other community members, to learn more about 
events that have transpired, to consider whether forgiveness might be 
possible, or to become educated as to potential next steps. Such hearings can 
also lead people to believe that the world has been put back into balance by 
punishing morally culpable animals, insects, or inanimate objects. While we 
no longer hold trials for animals or inanimate objects, it seems that some of 
these purposes remain part of our system of justice.   
iv. Other Goals and Costs 
In addition to truth, appropriate remedies, procedural justice, and 
education, other goals and costs have been and should be considered relevant 
to justice. As Professor Alan Dershowitz has explained: “Our system of 
justice . . . reflects a balance among often inconsistent goals, which include 
truth, privacy, fairness, finality, and quality.”212 Many years ago, political 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham expressed a similar thought, stating that while 
it is desirable to uncover truth, one also has to consider the costs of doing 
so—whether in terms of money, time, privacy, fairness, or vexation.213 Thus, 
in our country and others, we sometimes design procedural rules and 
investigatory practices to protect privacy, limit evidence,214 or exclude 
results of improper searches. That is, aspects of our practices and procedures 
                                                                                                                     
210 See Telford Taylor, The Nuremberg Trials, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 488, 498 (1955) (noting how 
Justice Jackson saw the Nuremberg Trials as an “unsettled period” that would “direct the world’s thought 
toward a firmer enforcement of the laws of international conduct” (internal citation omitted)). 
211 Charles E. Wyzanski, Nuremberg: A Fair Trial? A Dangerous Precedent, ATLANTIC (April 
1946), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1946/04/nuremberg-a-fair-trial-a-dangerous-
precedent/306492/. 
212 ALAN DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS 42 (1996). See also SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 
146, at 209 (noting that goals of trials include “promoting public acceptance of verdicts, expressing 
society’s values, asserting the authoritative power of the state, bringing closure to victims, and finalizing 
disputes”); Freedman, supra note 13, at 1063 (urging that while a trial is, in part, a search for truth, it 
also serves many other purposes, including protecting the parties’ dignity interests and constitutional 
rights). 
213 John D. Jackson, Theories of Truth Finding in Criminal Procedure: An Evolutionary Approach, 
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 483 (1988) (citing 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, A RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 
bk. 10, ch. 10, at 736–47 (photo. reprt. 1978) (1827)). 
214 See, e.g., PIZZI, supra note 143, at 48 (noting that “in the United States we have very tight rules 
of evidence”). 
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are geared to serve interests in fairness and justice and not merely lead to the 
discovery of the truth.215  
In sum, trials, both currently and historically, have been designed to do 
far more than uncover the truth. Despite what we often say, truth is not and 
has never been our exclusive goal nor certainly a guaranteed result of trials. 
We must keep these additional ideas in mind as we think about how best to 
design a system of justice to accommodate our new technology.  
2. Non-Adjudicatory Processes 
Trials are not the only means by which societies seek justice in civil and 
criminal matters. Whether one looks cross-culturally, historically, or at 
current practices in the United States, one will see that other 
non-adjudicatory216 mechanisms, including negotiation, mediation, 
community conferencing, and variants thereof, have been and are being used 
to resolve disputes.217  
Historically and cross-culturally, many societies’ systems of justice 
have placed far greater emphasis on harmony and healing than on 
adjudicatory individualistic approaches.218 In ancient Greece, philosopher 
Plato emphasized that justice consisted of a harmony—all elements of the 
society working well together.219 Similarly, many African, Pacific Island, 
                                                                                                                     
215 See, e.g., Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions, supra note 135, at 917 (“Appeals instead focus 
almost entirely on process questions—was the trial conducted in accordance with the rules?—rather than 
truth questions.”); Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143, 204 
(2011) (“Notwithstanding occasional pronouncements of the importance of finding the truth, that goal is 
effectively eclipsed by the prescribed procedural regime.”). See generally Herbert L. Packer, Two Models 
of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964) (juxtaposing a Due Process model and a Crime 
Control model of criminal justice). 
216 While some distinguish “adversarial” and “non-adversarial” processes, I prefer to distinguish 
“adjudicatory” and “non-adjudicatory” processes. By “adjudicatory” I mean those processes (trials and 
arbitration) that seek to find a single truth. Negotiations and mediations, by contrast, may resolve disputes 
without purporting to find a single truth. Disputants may be adverse and even hostile to one another in 
both kinds of processes. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An 
Argument That the Term “ADR” Has Begun to Outlive its Usefulness, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 97. 
217 For general background on non-adjudicatory processes, see generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES (6th ed. 2012) (describing 
the field of conflict resolution); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE 
ADVERSARIAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2018) (detailing different types of non-adjudicatory processes).  
218 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What is it and Does it Work? 10.2 
(Georgetown Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 1005485, 2007), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1005485 (“Restorative justice is the name given to a variety of different 
practices, including apologies, restitution, and acknowledgments of harm and injury, as well as to other 
efforts to provide healing and reintegration of offenders into their communities, with or without 
additional punishment.”); see also KEVIN AVRUCH, CULTURE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 12–15, 23–
26 (1998) (describing conflict resolution values throughout different societies). 
219 See, e.g., Plato, The Republic Book IV, in GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO 271, 283 (W.H.D. Rouse 
trans., 1961). See also STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 3–4 (2000) (stating that according to 
Plato, “justice consists in a harmony of the parts or elements, a harmony imposed by reason”); Andrew 
W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1665 (1985) (“Justice is 
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Native American, and other societies have focused on bringing the society 
or tribe back into balance, or on achieving harmony or reconciliation among 
members of the society.220 For example, Native Hawaiians used a process 
called “ho’oponopono,” which is drawn from the concept of disentangling 
fishing lines;221 and Navajo Indians traditionally used a community 
conferencing process geared to heal and restore the society.222 As well, even 
within the United States, smaller and sub-communities have used restorative 
and healing approaches throughout our history.223   
Examples of non-adjudicatory approaches to dispute resolution also 
exist within our current United States system of justice. Notably, though 
many conceive of our system as trial-based, the vast majority of criminal 
and civil matters are resolved through negotiation rather than through trials. 
On the criminal side, the Supreme Court has stated that between ninety-four 
and ninety-seven percent of cases are resolved through plea bargains,224 and 
most filed civil matters are also settled.225 Many court programs now include 
mandatory mediation and settlement conferences before permitting a matter 
                                                                                                                     
what we discover—you and I, Socrates said—when we walk together, listen together, and even love one 
another, in our curiosity about what justice is and where justice comes from.”).  
220 See, e.g., CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (Kevin Avruch et al. eds., 
1991) (cataloging different approaches to conflict resolution throughout cultures); Laura Nader, Styles of 
Court Procedure: To Make the Balance, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 69, 69–92 (Laura Nader ed., 
1969) (describing the balancing dispute resolution approach taken by Mexican Zapotec Indians); 2 THE 
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE 15–79 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) (presenting discussion of various 
countries’ reliance on informal justice). 
221 See, e.g., James A. Wall, Jr. & Ronda Roberts Callister, Ho’oponopono: Some Lessons from 
Hawaiian Mediation, 11 NEGOT. J. 45, 47 (1995) (explaining that traditional Hawaiian process aims to 
put things right, both spiritually and interpersonally, and ideally achieve mutual forgiveness). 
222 See, e.g., Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175, 
177–87 (1994) (contrasting the Western “vertical” system of justice, which relies on hierarchy and power 
to resolve disputes, to the Navajo “horizontal” system, in which no authority has to determine what is 
true and the goal is healing and restoration rather than determining right and wrong).  
223 See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983) (considering non-
adversarial approaches used by various American communities over the last several hundred years); THE 
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 220, at 18–21 (describing the American experience with 
informal justice). 
224 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012). The Court explicitly recognized that “ours ‘is for 
the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.’” Id. (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 
1388 (2012)). See generally ALKON & SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME, supra note 187.  
225 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004) (tracking the decline of civil 
trials in America).  
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to be heard in court.226 More generally, restorative227 and transformative228 
approaches are being used in courts and public policy settings throughout 
the world.  
While the differences among and between these processes are many, we 
focus here on the approach of non-adjudicatory processes to truth-finding. 
In short, truth-finding is not the focus of these processes. By contrast to 
trials, which typically look backwards to determine the truth of what 
happened and determine a consequent punishment or remedy, 
non-adjudicatory processes typically look forward. Disputants in 
non-adjudicatory processes may certainly care about their perceptions of 
what happened in the past, but civil disputes of all kinds are often resolved 
with settlement agreements that specifically disclaim findings of fault or 
responsibility.229 Similarly, although criminal defendants must often plead 
guilty to a crime to obtain their reduced sentence,230 these pleas are done 
with at least a bit of a wink, so that few assume that a plea agreement is 
really a factual determination.231 As advocates of non-adjudicatory 
processes have explained, this forward-looking orientation allows disputants 
to agree on future conduct without getting bogged down in the past.232 The 
                                                                                                                     
226 See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, Beyond “Managerial Judges”: Appropriate Roles in Settlement, 78 
OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 91 (2017) (stating that by the 1990s, mediation had become the most common form of 
ADR offered by federal courts); Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep 
on Looking: Lessons from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 412 
(2005) (establishing that many surveyed judges believe that mandatory mediation “may actually threaten 
litigants’ rights to substantive justice”). 
227 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice, supra note 218, at 10.2 (“In its most 
idealized form, there are four Rs of restorative justice: repair, restore, reconcile, and reintegrate the 
offenders and victims to each other and to their shared community.”). 
228 M. Kay Harris, Transformative Justice: The Transformation of Restorative Justice, in 
HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 555, 555 (Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft 
eds., 2006). 
229 Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information About Settlement in an 
Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 664–65 (2001). 
230 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and similar state rules, in theory require judges to 
make a factual determination that evidence supports guilt before accepting a guilty plea. See FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 11(b)(3). However, in some jurisdictions, “a prison sentence [may Constitutionally be imposed] 
upon an accused who is unwilling expressly to admit his guilt but who, faced with grim alternatives, is 
willing to waive his trial and accept the sentence.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 36 (1970). 
231 It is well recognized by experts that innocent defendants may plead guilty “due to the overall 
coercive atmosphere of plea bargaining.” Cynthia Alkon, Hard Bargaining in Plea Bargaining: When 
Do Prosecutors Cross the Line?, 17 NEV. L.J. 401, 414 (2017). See also SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 
146, at 210 (explaining that the public admission made in a plea bargain does not guarantee the accuracy 
of the plea, as plea bargains are driven primarily by tactical considerations).  
232 See, e.g., JAMES J. ALFINI, SHARON B. PRESS & JOSEPH B. STULBERG, MEDIATION THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 125 (3d ed. 2013) (suggesting that mediators “remind parties that they cannot change what 
happened in the past, but they can decide how they want things to be in the future”); Carrie J. Menkel-
Meadow, Remembrance of Things Past? The Relationship of Past to Future in Pursuing Justice in 
Mediation, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 97, 98 (2004) (observing that one of mediation’s “defining 
characteristics” is that “mediation is not required to deal with the past; it asks the parties to look to their 
futures and remake their duties and responsibilities toward each other”).  
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divorcing parents need not reach an agreement over who had what affairs or 
who wasted how much money to reach a settlement on child custody, child 
support, and other matters. The employee and employer need not come to a 
common understanding as to whether sexual harassment occurred for them 
to amicably part ways and agree on a severance package. The company can 
pay an injured person without conceding liability. 
Moreover, to the extent that non-adjudicatory processes do focus on the 
past, third-party neutrals and others involved in these processes tend to 
recognize that one’s view of truth depends on one’s perspective.233 For 
example, when disputants in a mediation make claims to truth, mediators 
may well encourage them to appreciate that while they have their opinion, 
others may see the world differently.234 For this reason, dispute resolution 
scholar Carrie Menkel-Meadow explains that negotiation and mediation can 
be seen as postmodernist, in that they can “permit[] several realities to ‘co-
exist’” and “enable relevant parties to ‘mediate’ their own stories and 
realities of the past.”235 She further states:  
I suggest the heretical notion that the adversary system may no 
longer be the best method for our legal system to deal with all 
of the matters that come within its purview. If late-twentieth 
century learning has taught us anything, it is that truth is 
illusive, partial, interpretable, dependent on the characteristics 
of the knowers as well as the known, and, most importantly, 
complex. . . . The binary nature of the adversary system and 
its particular methods and tactics often may thwart some of the 
essential goals of any legal system.236 
A second important way that non-adjudicatory processes differ from 
adjudicatory processes in their approach to justice is that they may view 
problems and disputes more broadly. Rather than focus primarily on legal 
rights and remedies, processes such as negotiation and mediation often look 
                                                                                                                     
233 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System, supra note 147, at 5–6 
(critiquing “[t]he binary nature of the adversarial system”).  
234 David A. Hoffman & Richard N. Wolman, The Psychology of Mediation, 14 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 759, 765, 769–70, 801 (2013) (discussing how mediators can help disputants 
appreciate that they are interpreting the same events in different ways). Cf. James R. Coben, Barnacles, 
Aristocracy and Truth Denial: Three Not So Beautiful Aspects of Contemporary Mediation, 16 CARDOZO 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 779, 781–82, 800–05 (2014) (expressing discomfort with the post-modernist views 
of mediation).  
235 Menkel-Meadow, Remembrance of Things Past?, supra note 232, at 104.  
236 Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System, supra note 147, at 5–6 (arguing that 
the adversary system is an “inadequate” and even “dangerous” method for satisfying important dispute 
resolution goals, and that “[b]inary, oppositional presentations of facts in dispute are not the best way for 
us to learn the truth”).  
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at disputants’ interests, problems, and goals.237 This broadening can 
potentially help individuals and communities heal their rifts.238 Thus, in the 
criminal context, a broader approach might consider a defendant’s 
education, mental and physical health, and employment options.239 
Examination of such factors might lead a justice system to emphasize 
reparations, apologies, or education over incarceration. Civilly, the broader 
approach might look at whether disputants wish to have a future personal or 
business relationship, whether disputants have non-monetary interests that 
might be used to forge a future agreement, or whether an apology might be 
meaningful to the disputants. When such factors are considered, sometimes 
disputant businesses or individuals can craft creative agreements that serve 
their interests more effectively than a court might decree.240 
III. HOW OUR NEW TECHNOLOGY CAN HELP US THINK MORE CLEARLY 
ABOUT WHAT WE SHOULD SEEK IN A SYSTEM OF JUSTICE 
With these broader goals in mind, we now return to the original 
question: how should we integrate our powerful new technology into our 
system of justice? We have seen that this technology may help us get to some 
truth, but that due to technical limits and our human psyches, we cannot 
realistically expect any technology to bring us truthful answers to all of our 
questions. We have also seen that while truth is relevant to justice, justice is 
far bigger than truth. How, then, should we design our justice system to best 
take account of the truth-finding capabilities of our new technology while 
                                                                                                                     
237 See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and 
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 14, 17–18 (1996) (explaining that 
mediators can encourage parties to approach disputes from either a broad or narrow perspective, and that 
mediators can also help disputants work towards resolution by either offering evaluations or instead 
merely facilitating disputants’ own discussions and insights).  
238 See, e.g., Lela P. Love, Images of Justice, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 29, 29–32 (2000) 
(describing, in artistic terms, the core distinctions between images of litigation, mediation, and 
arbitration); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human Problem 
Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 7, 18 (2004) 
(“Legal problem solving is not just about adversarial argument or persuasion about what is ‘right’ for the 
client; it is about understanding a range of possible goals for clients and those with whom they interact, 
and seeking both substantive outcomes and appropriate processes to satisfy the needs and interests of 
clients and those engaged in activity with the client.”).  
239 This broader approach is the premise of today’s “problem-solving courts.” See PAMELA M. 
CASEY & DAVID B. ROTTMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: MODELS 
AND TRENDS 1 (2003), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Publications/Justice%20System%20 
Journal/PROBLEM-SOLVING_COURTS_Models_and_Trends.ashx (providing an overview of 
problem-solving courts developed “in response to frustration by both the court system and the public to 
the large numbers of cases that seemed to be disposed repeatedly but not resolved”). 
240 Some of the classic U.S. dispute resolution literature espousing this approach includes ROGER 
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce 
Patton ed., 3d ed. 2011) and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The 
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).  
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also serving our greater interests in justice? While I do not purport to have 
all the answers, I am certain it is critically important to systematically 
anticipate how best to incorporate our new technology into our systems of 
dispute resolution.241 As one commentator put it: “[T]he accelerating 
technological tsunami is a Pandora’s box likely to eclipse all other influences 
on human interaction, for good and for ill.”242 Thus, I see this Article as the 
beginning of an extremely important brainstorming session.243  
As we engage in this mental exercise, I propose two preliminary ideas. 
First, I do not think we should aim to devise a single form of dispute 
resolution, but rather suggest that we should look for multiple processes that, 
together, can comprise a just system of dispute resolution. Like others in my 
field, I believe in “process pluralism,” the idea that no single process is best 
for all circumstances.244 Multiple processes are likely also essential to take 
account of the fact that we have no single conception of justice. Second, I 
urge that we allow ourselves to think broadly and creatively about our 
systems of justice, without worrying about current legal rules and limits. I 
realize, of course, that the U.S. Constitution sets significant constraints for 
how our dispute resolution systems might be redesigned. The Sixth and 
Seventh Amendments, for example, require that a jury trial be afforded in 
many criminal and civil cases.245 Yet, while I have sometimes fiercely 
defended the right to a civil jury trial,246 I suggest we try to think about how 
our new technology should impact our dispute resolution systems from 
purely a policy perspective, and leave to another day the question of what is 
possible under our existing Constitution. In theory, at least, we might want 
to amend the Constitution. Conceivably, a form of dispute resolution that 
made sense hundreds of years ago, when disputes were resolved based on 
personal observations and live witness testimony, will no longer be the most 
                                                                                                                     
241 Many years ago, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger used the term “systematic anticipation” to 
encourage us to rethink how best to design our justice system. See generally Warren E. Burger, Agenda 
for 2000 A.D.–Need for Systematic Anticipation, 15 JUDGES’ J. 27 (1976) (providing the keynote address 
at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
also known as the “Pound Conference”).  
242 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Living the Dream of ADR: Reflections on Four Decades of the Quiet 
Revolution in Dispute Resolution, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 513, 514 (2017).  
243 While brainstorming is generally thought of as a group activity, recent psychological research 
shows that creativity is enhanced when group members first search for solutions individually, lest their 
ideas be squelched by group behaviors. See, e.g., Art Markman, Your Team is Brainstorming All Wrong, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (May 18, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/05/your-team-is-brainstorming-all-wrong 
(discussing brainstorming techniques that “allow individual work during divergent phases of creativity 
and group work during convergent phases”). 
244 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of 
Legal Processes, 94 GEO. L.J. 553, 554–55 (2006) (explaining “process pluralism”).  
245 U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.  
246 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh 
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 669, 669–733 (2001) (discussing jury trial 
rights under the Seventh Amendment). 
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appropriate means to resolve disputes in our brave new era of sophisticated 
technology. 
Moving on from these preliminaries, I further suggest that we consider 
three primary issues as we ponder what forms of dispute resolution will best 
serve justice in our new era of technology-assisted dispute resolution: (1) 
what forms of dispute resolution may help us resolve technical issues that 
will inevitably arise; (2) what forms of dispute resolution may help us deal 
with human psychology that causes people to react differently than one 
another to given technological data; and (3) what forms of dispute resolution 
will help us think more clearly about issues other than truth—that is how 
best to handle situations once we know the truth of what happened.  
A. Resolving Technical Issues 
As our evidence becomes increasingly scientific, we need to devise 
ways to better integrate competent technical analysis into our dispute 
resolution. In part, this requires us to look again at an issue that we have 
been considering for over a hundred years: do judges and juries have 
sufficient ability to understand and evaluate scientific evidence, and if not, 
what reforms should be made?247 Jurors’ forte was once their knowledge of 
the community.248 We later relied on jurors’ supposed common sense and 
purported ability to determine witness veracity.249 Judges are trained in 
interpreting the law. But neither judges nor jurors typically have scientific 
training that will help them resolve such questions as whether the DNA 
matches, whether the geo-location data is reliable, or whether a video has 
been faked.250 Nor am I convinced that an inquisitorial system is inherently 
                                                                                                                     
247 See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Learned Hand, 
J.) (“How long we shall continue to blunder along without the aid of unpartisan and authoritative 
scientific assistance in the administration of justice, no one knows; but all fair persons not 
conventionalized by provincial legal habits of mind ought, I should think, unite to effect some such 
advance.”); see also Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1535, 1539 (1998) (arguing that because judges and juries generally lack “epistemic” competence 
their decisions often fail to provide “intellectual due process”); Learned Hand, Historical and Practical 
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1901) (“No one will deny that 
the law should in some way effectively use expert knowledge wherever it will aid in settling disputes. 
The only question is as to how it can do so best.”). See generally TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS 
OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 6 (2007) 
(discussing the difficulties in early adaptations of experts in the adversarial environment).  
248 See OLDHAM, supra note 15, at 2–3 (describing how, in the “early era of the jury in England,” 
“the jurors came from the neighborhood, and some of them, at least, were expected to know or to find 
out the facts of the dispute in litigation”).  
249 See, e.g., Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 169 (1989) (drawing on psychology to critique jurors’ supposed common 
sensibility to evaluate witness credibility).  
250 While some may assume that judges would at least be more scientifically competent than jurors, 
this is not necessarily so. See Brewer, supra note 247, at 1677–78.  
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better suited to resolve technical issues than is an adversarial process.251  The 
fundamental problem, as Professor Scott Brewer explained twenty years 
ago, is that it is increasingly unlikely that “one and the same decisionmaker 
has both legal legitimacy . . . and epistemic competence with the basic 
formal tools of scientific analysis.”252 As we become increasingly focused 
on technology and as this technology advances and covers a broad array of 
fields, it will be increasingly difficult or more likely impossible to find 
individuals who possess both sets of expertise.253 Realistically, not even the 
same scientist—much less the same scientist/judge—would have the 
expertise to assess DNA, brain scans, and video evidence.254 
To date in the United States, we have primarily relied on dueling expert 
witnesses to help judges and juries evaluate technical evidence.255 While we 
can tell ourselves that this works, and it does to some degree, many have 
questioned whether this is the best means to evaluate scientific evidence.256 
First, even with the help of experts, untrained judges and juries may not be 
                                                                                                                     
251 Cf. Sevier, A [Relational] Theory of Procedure, supra note 14, at 5–6.  
252 Brewer, supra note 247, at 1677 (suggesting four possible ways of achieving a “two-hat 
solution”: (1) sending decisions currently made in private litigation to public agencies staffed by 
scientists; (2) using “blue ribbon scientifically trained juries”; (3) relying on “scientific expert magistrate 
judges”; or (4) sending certain matters to “science courts staffed by scientifically trained judges”).  
253 See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of 
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 498 (2005) (discussing the “vanishingly small 
effect” Daubert standards have on the removal rate); Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert 
on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 339, 339 (2002) (“Scientific and technical advances are being made daily; therefore, keeping up to 
date on all, or even most, of these advancements is nearly impossible.”).  
254 Proposals have, however, been made that might at least aid judicial and juror comprehension of 
scientific evidence. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 
19, 40–41 (2007) (describing “the use of juror note-taking, the use of jury notebooks in appropriate cases, 
the careful consideration of using juror questions, and the option of allowing jurors to discuss evidence 
as the case proceeds rather than waiting for the final deliberations”); N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, 
Jurors and Scientific Causation: What Don’t They Know, and What Can Be Done About It?, 52 
JURIMETRICS 433, 433 (2012) (training jurors to be better “consumers” of evidence through an 
“educational intervention”). See also Melissa Whitney, How to Improve Technical Expertise for Judges 
in AI-related Litigation, BROOKINGS (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-
improve-technical-expertise-for-judges-in-ai-related-litigation/ (summarizing Brookings Institution 
report on improving judges’ technical expertise). 
255 For an examination of how judges apply current case law regarding the admissibility of scientific 
evidence, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY (2018).  
256 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 
BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2008) (observing that “a century’s worth of writing about expert evidence 
circles around the same themes and consistently reaches the same conclusion: that the use of 
party-selected expert witnesses in an adversarial legal system is fraught with difficulties”). See also Lora 
M. Levett & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effectiveness of Opposing Expert Witnesses for Educating Jurors 
About Unreliable Expert Evidence, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 363, 372 (2008) (finding adversarial model 
does not effectively educate jurors about strengths and weaknesses of expert testimony, instead tending 
to make jurors skeptical about all expert testimony). 
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able to make good technical determinations.257 In a battle of experts, judge 
or jury may be swayed by charisma or fall prey to the mistakes of a 
well-meaning expert.258 Second, wealthier parties will be advantaged in 
hiring technical experts.259 In the criminal setting, this disparity will often 
favor the prosecution, as indigent, poor, or even middle class defendants 
often will not be able to hire experts to challenge the prosecution’s 
evidence.260 In civil cases, a richer party could even potentially manufacture 
evidence and use it to win a claim against a poorer party, potentially unable 
to hire the experts necessary to defeat a claim for theft, fraud, or breach of 
contract. The difficulty in evaluating technical evidence will also impact 
non-adjudicatory forms of dispute resolution. In the future, we will be 
negotiating and mediating in the shadow of technical evidence, as well as 
trial. While the fact that our justice system is impacted by wealth inequalities 
is not new, these disparities will be significantly heightened with the 
increasing importance of technical evidence. 
As we become more highly dependent on scientific and technical 
information, it may be appropriate to ask a non-partisan scientific entity to 
evaluate such information.261 Specifically, we might consider having a panel 
of neutral highly credentialed scientific experts, paid for by tax dollars, 
charged with examining certain kinds of scientific evidence pertaining to 
claims brought in a particular jurisdiction.262 These sorts of panels have 
                                                                                                                     
257 Many empirical studies examine the competence of both judges and juries to make scientific and 
technical determinations. The results are mixed, generally showing that judges and juries are neither 
entirely competent nor entirely incompetent. See, e.g., Hans, supra note 254, at 21 (stating that while 
there are difficulties, most research indicates that juries do reasonably well in understanding complex 
evidence); Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 
1121, 1146, 1180 (2001) (discussing how jurors’ use of evidence and response to various forms of expert 
evidence differs in each case). 
258 See, e.g., James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 247, 266–67 
(2018) (stating that “[d]ecision makers who lack the ability to engage with the substance of an expert 
disagreement must fall back on heuristic shortcuts,” such as the demeanor and credentials of the testifying 
expert). 
259 See David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil Cases, 
41 HASTINGS L.J. 281, 281 (1990) (discussing that “[t]he ability to obtain an expert witness can be a 
decisive factor in civil litigation,” meaning indigent civil litigants are at a disadvantage).  
260 See Findley, Innocents at Risk, supra note 135, at 898–902 (describing the accused’s 
“disadvantage by lack of access to crime scene evidence and investigative resources”). Occasionally this 
economic disparity will favor a wealthy criminal defendant, such as O.J. Simpson, who was able to hire 
a “dream team” of attorneys to dispute the government’s double murder case against him. It is estimated 
that O.J.’s “dream team” cost him $50,000 a day. Jason Guerrasio, How O.J. Simpson Paid for the 
‘Dream Team’ of Lawyers on His Murder Trial, BUS. INSIDER (June 19, 2016, 2:27 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-oj-simpson-paid-for-the-dream-team-2016-6.  
261 For a discussion of the use of expert panels in the administrative law context, see Adrian 
Vermeule, The Parliament of the Experts, 58 DUKE L.J. 2231 (2009).   
262 See Dillon, supra note 258, at 252 (suggesting creation of “an administrative office staffed by 
individuals with expertise in a range of scientific domains that most commonly arise in litigation” who 
might be granted authority to decide legal questions requiring scientific judgment). Cf. Nancy J. Brekke 
et al., Of Juries and Court-Appointed Experts: The Impact of Nonadversarial Versus Adversarial Expert 
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already been considered in other contexts, such as mass torts.263 There could 
be many versions of such an idea, with variations as to how many panel 
members should be consulted and the kinds of issues panel members should 
consider. Such an expert panel might for example make general 
determinations that certain tests (such as polygraphs) could never or might 
sometimes be relied upon in a legal setting.264 In specific cases, such a panel 
might also opine on whether a particular technical finding based on DNA, 
fingerprint analysis, or video was sufficiently reliable in that instance. With 
respect to the interaction between panel and legal expertise, such panel 
determinations might be either evidence to be considered by a judge or jury, 
or perhaps even final rulings in some situations.  
The idea of having scientific issues resolved by a governmental panel 
has its roots in prior proposals that would appoint a single non-partisan 
expert to assist jurors and judges in their deliberations.265 The Federal Rules 
of Evidence already permit judges to appoint such experts, and they 
sometimes do so.266 Along similar lines, judges sometimes appoint special 
masters who have scientific training to help resolve technical evidentiary or 
similar issues.267 However, the panel I am suggesting would potentially go 
further than these proposals, perhaps finally resolving certain technical 
issues rather than merely offering testimony to a jury, judge, or other 
decisionmaker.  
Admittedly, the idea of government panels is not a perfect solution and, 
as noted, many details regarding cost, neutrality, probabilistic parameters, 
and jurisdiction would need to be worked out.268 Yet, while the problems 
with the proposal are evident, the growing importance of technical evidence 
will force us to consider this or similar options. It will be increasingly 
                                                                                                                     
Testimony, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 451, 451 (1991) (finding that jurors pay more attention to battling 
adversarial experts than to a single court-appointed expert). 
263 See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan, Would a Federal Judicial Science Board Improve Toxic Tort 
Litigation?, 17 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 761, 762 (1990) (considering the benefit of installing a Federal 
Judicial Science Board to deal with experts in toxic tort litigation).   
264 Such a panel might essentially be charged with making the “reliability” portion of the 
determination required by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 
579, 592–95 (1993). See also FED. R. EVID. 702 (providing in part that expert testimony must be “the 
product of reliable principles and methods”). 
265 See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 
HARV. L. REV. 40, 56 (1901) (suggesting a new way to present expert testimony). See also Jennifer L. 
Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts: An Intellectual History of Expert Evidence, 52 
VILL. L. REV. 763 (2007) (analyzing the role and reliability of experts).  
266 FED. R. EVID. 706. For a discussion of the creation of a special panel of experts to consider 
scientific claims pertaining to silicone breast implants, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A CONVERGENCE 
OF SCIENCE AND LAW: A SUMMARY REPORT OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, 
AND LAW PANEL 5–8 (2001). 
267 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 266, at 7; Hans, supra note 254, at 20. 
268 For other issues to be resolved, see supra text accompanying note 261–267. 
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infeasible and unfair to simply rely on lay persons, whether jurors or judges, 
to decide complex scientific issues, even with the help of expert witnesses.   
At the same time, while determining the technical validity of potential 
evidence will be tough, this is only one of several problems to be 
considered—and is really the easiest one. We now turn our attention to the 
harder issues. 
B. Dealing with Multiple Interpretations 
Even assuming that our new technology provides information that is 
genuine and accurate, we know that interpretive issues will often remain.269 
We have seen that technology does not speak for itself but rather is 
interpreted by human investigators, attorneys, disputants, jurors, and judges, 
based on their prior experiences and knowledge.270 While we each typically 
believe that our own interpretation is obvious and right, research shows that 
others may interpret the same evidence quite differently and be equally sure 
they are right.  
One of our existing forms of dispute resolution, the jury trial, might 
seem ideal to handle the fact that the same evidence may be viewed and 
interpreted differently by different people.271 While juries may not be 
particularly adept at analyzing technical evidence, it is frequently assumed 
they would be fairly well suited to providing diverse interpretations on 
videos, pictures, or other pieces of technical evidence. Juries are at least 
supposed to provide diversity from the community.272 It seems logical that a 
group of twelve or even six community members,273 required to deliberate 
with one another,274 might help each other see that their individual 
                                                                                                                     
269 Note that there may be an interaction between scientific incompetence and psychological 
preconceptions or biases. See Dillon, supra note 258, at 266–67 (“Decision makers who lack the ability 
to engage with the substance of an expert disagreement must fall back on heuristic shortcuts to reach a 
decision; in so doing, they open the door for implicit (or at times explicit) biases to affect the process.”).   
270 See supra text accompanying note 163.  
271 See Francis X. Flanagan, Race, Gender, and Juries: Evidence from North Carolina, 61 J.L. & 
ECON. 189, 212 (2018) (concluding that the race and gender composition of the jury pool significantly 
impacts the likelihood of conviction).   
272 Francis X. Flanagan, Peremptory Challenges and Jury Selection, 58 J.L. & ECON. 385, 395 
(2015) (finding that lawyers’ exercise of peremptory challenges tends to make juries more homogenous). 
See Hans Zeisel & Shari S. Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An 
Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 531 (1978) (concluding that voir dire 
process leads to different results in some cases).  
273 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970) (finding the use of six-person juries in criminal 
cases to be constitutionally permissible).   
274 See generally DENNIS J. DEVINE, JURY DECISION MAKING: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 152–80 
(2012) (collecting social science on the impact of deliberation in contrast to allowing jurors to reach 
independent conclusions); SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 146, at 197–202 (discussing the effects of jury 
deliberation).  
 
 260 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1 
interpretations are subject to challenge.275 Jury researchers Neil Vidmar and 
Valerie Hans state: “The idea of a representative jury is a compelling one. A 
jury of people with a wide range of backgrounds, life experiences, and world 
knowledge will promote accurate fact-finding . . . .”276 Certainly the hope is 
that as jurors deliberate, they will help one another get beyond their improper 
biases and set aside incorrect information.277 
In fact, however, psychological research is quite mixed on the extent to 
which jury deliberation can cure or even ameliorate preconceptions and 
biases.278 Dennis J. Devine, who has studied this issue for many years, 
explains: 
On one hand, deliberation could cause jurors to examine the 
evidence more actively and critically, increasing the chance 
that juries arrive at the “correct” decision in relation to their 
constituent members. According to this view, the biases and 
prejudices of individual members will tend to cancel out 
during deliberation. On the other hand, deliberation could 
potentially make matters worse, amplifying and propagating 
the biases of their members.279   
That is, while jurors with disparate perspectives can potentially help one 
another see evidence through different lenses,280 aspects of individual 
psychology and group decision making sometimes cause amplification 
rather than diminution of individual biases as jurors try to convince one 
another their views are correct.281 Devine and others conclude that the 
                                                                                                                     
275 DEVINE, supra note 274, at 179–80 (discussing many ways in which deliberation can impact 
jury decision making); SIMON, IN DOUBT, supra note 146, at 198 (stating deliberative jury decisions are 
not necessarily either better or worse than decisions made by individual jurors).   
276 NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES 74 (2007).  
277 DEVINE, supra note 274, at 179.   
278 Id. This same ambiguity affects many different kinds of groups—from boards of directors to 
community groups to law faculties. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND 
GROUPTHINK TO MAKE GROUPS SMARTER 2 (2014) (“Do groups usually correct individual mistakes? 
Our simple answer is that they do not. Far too often, groups actually amplify those mistakes. With respect 
to the planning fallacy, for example, groups turn out to be even worse than individuals are—which is a 
clue to a lot of failures in business, government, and daily life.”).   
279 DEVINE, supra note 274, at 177–78. See also Shari Seidman Diamond & Mary R. Rose, The 
Contemporary American Jury, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 239 (2018) (advocating more research into 
the jury decision making process). 
280 See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying 
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597, 
597 (2006) (reporting that racially diverse juries exchanged more information than all-white juries and 
were more amenable to discussions of racism). See also Anita Woolley & Thomas W. Malone, Defend 
Your Research: What Makes a Team Smarter? More Women, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2011), 
https://hbr.org/2011/06/defend-your-research-what-makes-a-team-smarter-more-women (discussing the 
impact women have in groupthink).  
281 See, e.g., Sara Gordon, All Together Now: Using Principles of Group Dynamics to Train Better 
Jurors, 48 IND. L. REV. 415, 440–48 (2015) (reporting that group conformity, free riding, and social 
 
 2020] JUSTICE IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD? 261 
determinants of whether individual biases are diminished or enhanced are 
factors such as the strength of the evidence and the distribution of 
bias/preconception amongst the jurors.282 While it is conceivable that jurors 
might be trained to get beyond some of the impediments to good 
deliberation,283 this approach has not been empirically validated and could 
be difficult to implement.284 In short, juries are no panacea in terms of 
incorporating multiple perspectives. Perhaps we might come up with other 
approaches that would do as well or better at securing community input that 
might ameliorate inappropriate biases. 
In the criminal law context, grand juries have historically provided an 
opportunity for prosecutors to gain input from a broader segment of the 
community before bringing charges.285 Pursuant to this practice, which is 
used in federal courts for felonies and also in about half the states,286 a group 
of roughly twenty citizens is asked to opine on whether probable cause exists 
to bring charges against a particular person or entity.287 Admittedly, in our 
current system, the grand jury seems to provide little check on prosecutors, 
as it is often joked that a grand jury would even indict a ham sandwich if the 
prosecutor asked it to do so.288 Yet, despite the practical limits to the existing 
grand jury process, in theory, at least, a mechanism akin to the grand jury 
                                                                                                                     
loafing may undermine jurors’ willingness or ability to challenge others’ views); Christine L. Ruva & 
Christina C. Guenther, Keep Your Bias to Yourself: How Deliberating With Differently Biased Others 
Affects Mock-Jurors’ Guilt Decisions, Perceptions of the Defendant, Memories and Evidence 
Interpretation, 41 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 478, 479 (2017) (explaining that group polarization may lead jurors 
with different views to anchor into those views more deeply if confronted by another perspective). 
282  See DEVINE, supra note 274, at 179 (noting that groups tend to be better at incorporating 
members’ views in extreme cases, when evidence is generally very strong or very weak, but in more 
moderate or ambiguous cases the deliberation process may exacerbate differences among jurors or 
biases).   
283 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 281, at 423–24 (advocating that juries be trained in group 
dynamics).  
284 That is, it would likely be time consuming and expensive.  
285 See generally GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY (Roger Anthony 
Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2010) (outlining historical practices of grand juries and arguing for new approaches to 
help deter mass incarceration). 
286 SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 8:2 (2018). 
287 See Roger A. Fairfax Jr., The Grand Jury’s Role in the Prosecution of Unjustified Police Killings 
– Challenges and Solutions, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 397, 401–03 (2017). See generally Niki Kuckes, 
Retelling Grand Jury History, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 125 
(Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2010) (disputing Supreme Court’s description of grand jury history).  
288 Grand juries are presumably compliant because they only hear the prosecutor’s side of the case, 
and not the potential defendant’s. Some have suggested we reform the current grand jury system by 
appointing counsel who could provide independent guidance to the grand jury members. See Fairfax Jr., 
supra note 287, at 414, 417 (explaining “independent prosecutor” models). See also Ric Simmons, The 
Role of the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury in Police Use of Deadly Force Cases: Restoring the Grand 
Jury To Its Original Purpose, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 519, 520–23 (2017) (explaining that grand juries’ 
compliance is attributable in part to the Supreme Court decisions refusing to apply hearsay or other 
evidentiary exclusions in the grand jury setting). 
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could allow much needed community289 input to check a prosecutor’s 
reading of scientific evidence.290 A true cross-section of the community 
might offer an alternative interpretation of a photo or video, or even of 
bacterial, DNA, or brainwave evidence. For this reason, while not focusing 
on scientific evidence, multiple commentators have already suggested that 
we place greater emphasis on the grand jury process in order to rein in 
prosecutorial discretion.291 While grand jury members will no doubt have 
their own predispositions and biases, prosecutors could at least learn that 
their own perspectives are not universal.292 That is, community members 
with different racial, ethnic, or political backgrounds, or simply persons who 
are not members of a law enforcement community, might take a fresh look 
at a video, pictures, fingerprints, brain scans, or similar evidence. Of course, 
to avoid the ham sandwich problem we would need to reform current 
practice to provide the grand jury with greater independence from the 
prosecutor than currently exists.293 But the idea of having early independent 
community review of technical evidence may be worth pursuing. Indeed, 
perhaps there might be a way to solicit community input on technical 
evidence such as videos or photos in civil as well as criminal cases.       
In this modern age, there may also be other better ways than a traditional 
jury or grand jury to gain insights that might lessen biases and 
preconceptions affecting the interpretation of technical evidence. 
Specifically, we might use the internet to ask persons from different classes, 
races, genders, political parties, and so on to opine on the meaning of a 
photo, video, or even DNA evidence.294 With the internet, we need not rely 
                                                                                                                     
289 As others have observed, the relevant “community” could be defined in multiple ways. See, e.g., 
Adriaan Lanni, Implementing the Neighborhood Grand Jury, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 171, 172–73 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2010) (explaining the 
“neighborhood grand jury” model wherein local community members play an active role in prosecutorial 
charging decisions). 
290 Of course, this might be a good idea for other evidence too. 
291 See, e.g., Lanni, supra note 289, at 171 (explaining the prosecutor’s potentially overbroad 
power); Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON 
THE GRAND JURY 253–55 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2010) (criticizing the lack of attention grand 
juries and their biases receive).   
292 See Fairfax Jr., supra note 287, at 404 (explaining the basis for grand juror biases driving 
decision making). 
293 See id. at 416 (“Perhaps the most important factor related to the grand jury’s effectiveness . . . is 
the real or perceived lack of independence of the prosecutor who is tasked with investigating and bringing 
charges . . . .”). 
294 See Samuel D. Gosling & Winter Mason, Internet Research in Psychology, 66 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 877, 878 (2015) (noting the ease with which various media can be incorporated into studies 
done through the internet); see also Michael Buhrmester et al., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New 
Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 3 (2011) (describing an 
online platform employing a diverse workforce representing more than 100 countries); Scott Plous, 
Online Social Psychology Studies, SOC. PSYCHOL. NETWORK, 
https://www.socialpsychology.org/expts.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2019) (collecting web-based 
experiments and surveys).   
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on the purported randomness of jury selection and voir dire to hope that we 
get a good cross-section of the community, but rather can even target 
particular populations and solicit their views.295 Admittedly, no research tool 
is perfect. Anyone who relies on the internet will for example want to 
consider whether certain populations lack access to the internet, and whether 
the anonymity of the internet may cause responders to be sloppy or even 
prevaricate. However, those who have looked at these issues are generally 
quite pleased with the internet’s potential as a research tool.296 This idea, of 
drawing broadly on the perspective of the citizenry, resembles the concept 
of the “citizens’ jury” that is sometimes being used in the United States and 
around the world to solicit input on public policy issues.297 
Logistically, how might these or other ideas be implemented to solicit 
peoples’ disparate views on technological data? In the criminal context, it is 
fairly easy to imagine that police or prosecutors might solicit alternative 
interpretations of photos, videos, or other potential evidence, whether 
through a version of grand juries or perhaps using the internet. While some 
might suggest that prosecutors would never do this, because they only want 
to interpret evidence in order to secure convictions, perhaps this is overly 
cynical. First, it is well known and often stated that prosecutors’ duty is to 
serve justice, not merely to obtain convictions.298 This is sometimes more 
than baloney. Recently, a few prosecutors in major jurisdictions have 
announced that they are seeking progressive reforms.299 Second, even those 
prosecutors who are geared to obtain convictions whenever possible have an 
interest in understanding how evidence will be interpreted by jurors or other 
finders of fact. It does not serve such prosecutors’ interest to rely on 
particular evidence to support a conviction if, in the end, many viewers will 
see it as non-incriminating.    
On the civil side, lawyers or disputants themselves may want to get an 
early read on how their technical evidence might be viewed by a judge or 
                                                                                                                     
295 See, e.g., Gosling & Mason, supra note 294, at 890–91 (explaining the benefits and uses of 
targeting populations for data collection through the internet). 
296 See, e.g., id. at 892–93 (explaining the potential for misrepresentation based on certain classes’ 
lack of access to the internet or dishonesty of internet users).   
297 See, e.g., Rob D. Fish et al., Employing the Citizens’ Jury Technique to Elicit Reasoned Public 
Judgments About Environmental Risk: Insights from an Inquiry into the Governance of Microbial Water 
Pollution, 57 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 233, 233 (2014) (explaining the role of a citizens’ jury in 
providing public judgment about environmental policy issues).   
298 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
607, 612–18 (1999) (outlining the historical and current concept of “the duty to seek justice”). 
299 Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner is one example. Ben Austen, In Philadelphia, a 
Progressive D.A. Tests the Power – and Learns the Limits – Of His Office, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 30, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/30/magazine/larry-krasner-philadelphia-district-attorney-
progressive.html. See also Rebecca McCray, Brooklyn District Attorney Candidates Spar for Title of 
‘Most Progressive’, APPEAL (Aug. 31, 2017), https://theappeal.org/brooklyn-district-attorney-
candidates-spar-for-title-of-most-progressive-fbd600efeae6/ (explaining the progressive platforms of 
candidates for Brooklyn District Attorney). 
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jury. To some degree, this is already done. Jury consultants provide a broad 
range of services to attorneys, and sometimes may use the internet to predict 
how an actual jury would react to the case. For example, a company called 
DecisionQuest advertises that it uses “[t]he power of the internet” to let 
attorneys see, at a fairly low cost, how a large and diverse pool of persons 
might respond to particular arguments or evidence.300 While these 
companies currently emphasize using surveys based on written fact patterns, 
it is easy to imagine using them to have internet users opine on particular 
photos, videos, or other forms of evidence.  
Thinking more expansively, might it also be appropriate in this era to 
require our system of justice to solicit a broader range of views in civil and 
criminal cases? Why depend on, at most, twelve possibly diverse jurors to 
opine on the meaning of scientific evidence? Further, even assuming 
diversity among jurors, we have seen that the group decision making process 
may deter some jurors from expressing their contrary views.301 Instead, we 
could require those disputants who rely on various kinds of scientific 
evidence to have it vetted by a large group of diverse persons to determine 
how they view that information. Even if those views were not binding, 
perhaps they would be relevant to the disputants or to the decisionmakers 
and help them appreciate others’ perspectives?   
While the ideas discussed in this Section are not spelled out in detail, 
surely it is worth considering these kinds of options as a means to deal with 
the biases that will be so important in interpreting our new technical 
evidence?  
C. Justice Beyond Truth 
Ironically, the greatest contribution of our new technology to dispute 
resolution may be that it helps us focus more on the non-truth aspects of 
justice. To the extent that our new technology can help us answer basic 
“what happened” questions,302 we will be able to pay more attention to other 
aspects of justice. Given that X happened, why did it happen? What do we 
want to do about it? Should we punish someone? If so, how? Should we seek 
reparations or compensation? Ask for apologies? Educate our fellow 
community members? Implement reforms to prevent such problems from 
                                                                                                                     
300 DECISIONQUEST, http://www.decisionquest.com/services/online-jury-research/ (last visited Jan. 
25, 2019) (relying on online surveys); see also R&D ONLINE SERVICES, https://www.rd-
ss.com/rd_services_online/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2019) (stating that it uses “the immediacy of the Internet” 
to assess cases in a cost-effective manner). In addition, ejury.com uses the internet to solicit feedback 
from members of the public in order to help attorneys try to settle their cases. See Bryan Edelman, Using 
Online Surveys to Conduct Jury Research, JURY EXPERT (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2011/11/using-online-surveys-to-conduct-jury-research/ (explaining the 
use of online surveys in jury research).   
301 See supra text accompanying notes 275–81. 
302 While the technology will not find all truths, it will provide some useful information that would 
not otherwise have been available. 
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occurring in the future? And, we can focus more on such structural issues as 
how best to provide procedural justice, educate the community, enforce 
community norms, ensure appropriate privacy, and resolve disputes 
efficiently and effectively. 
If we seek to focus more on the non-truth aspects of dispute resolution, 
what form or forms of dispute resolution make most sense in our modern 
world, where many of us have different perspectives on the appropriate goals 
of a justice system, and where most members of the society likely have no 
prior knowledge of the individuals who may have been involved in criminal 
or civil disputes? Perhaps it is best to rely, as we do with trials, on a system 
where a legislature passes laws based on beliefs held by at least a majority 
of the society. These laws both lay out the rules of behavior and provide 
many of the consequences when rules are broken, leaving fairly little 
discretion in the hands of factfinders such as judges and juries. Or, once we 
know who did what to whom, perhaps we should afford more discretion to 
either individual disputants or communities. And maybe we can devise more 
accessible processes, in which disputants can more fully tell their stories, 
and thus feel as if they have received more procedural justice.  
While our current trial-centric approach to justice may feel inevitable, 
in fact it is not. There is no reason to see trials as the necessary endpoint in 
the evolution of our dispute resolution systems.303 Trials, certainly, can be a 
very good form of dispute resolution. In the pre-technology era, they were a 
reasonably effective way of trying to determine the truth of what happened. 
They were also a useful way to bring communities together, to share social 
norms, to vent emotions, and to provide procedural justice. Trials could be 
provided fairly cheaply and quickly, as well. Equally, however, other forms 
of dispute resolution (negotiation, mediation, group conferencing, etc.) can 
also serve many of these interests and others, and sometimes more 
effectively. Both domestically and also internationally, we are seeing 
disputants and communities use an array of restorative304 and 
transformative305 approaches that emphasize remedies including apology, 
restitution, reconciliation, and institutional reform, rather than focus 
exclusively on applying law to a narrow problem. Non-trial approaches can 
be better than trials at healing rifts, achieving broader solutions, and 
resolving disputes efficiently and effectively. By way of inspiration, here are 
just a few preliminary ideas as to how we could change our system of justice.  
One relatively modest reform might be to provide judges/juries with 
                                                                                                                     
303 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is the Adversary System Really Dead? Dilemmas of Legal Ethics as 
Legal Institutions and Roles Evolve, 57 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 85, 89 (2004). See also Michael Moffitt, 
Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727, 728 (2005) (observing that civil pleadings, which 
by their nature look backwards and focus primarily on monetary relief, are not well-structured to help 
disputants find efficient resolutions to more forward-looking and non-monetary problems).   
304 See supra note 218.  
305 See supra note 228.  
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more discretion to devise “appropriate” remedies—expanding beyond our 
current focus on prison and monetary damages. That is, rather than have 
trials primarily examine issues of liability or guilt, which will increasingly 
be resolved by our new technology, we might also use trials to more 
carefully consider the “then what” issues—how best to deal with any legal 
infractions that have occurred. Judges and juries might be asked to look more 
at underlying issues—why people did the things they did. Armed with such 
information, judges and juries could be more creative at the remedial stage, 
for example putting heightened emphasis on apologies, reparations, or 
community service. Or then again, perhaps such background information 
would lead judges and juries to want to be more punitive or to employ more 
public notifications or shaming of perpetrators.306  
Alternatively, perhaps we will want to put more emphasis on 
encouraging disputants to work out their own problems—whether through 
negotiation, mediation, or other versions of individualized dispute 
resolution. If trials are less needed to get at truth in our new technological 
world, perhaps individual disputants are best situated to get at their 
underlying motivations and to determine how the problems between them 
should be resolved? As mediation advocates have urged for many years, 
individuals know themselves best, and processes like mediation can also be 
used to allow disputants to come to know one another better.307 
Unconstrained by the formal rules of court, disputants can explore 
underlying motivations and rationales and become more informed about 
how their fellow disputant sees the world. Through these conversations, 
more creative, just solutions may emerge.308   
Or, perhaps our new focus on non-truth aspects of justice might lead us 
in the opposite direction—to seek more involvement of the larger 
community in our justice decisions. Similar to how our medieval ancestors 
chose to publicly discuss the problems of animals and insects eating crops 
or harming humans,309 and to how the Goddess Athena asked the citizens to 
weigh in on whether and how Orestes should be punished for killing his 
                                                                                                                     
306 Personally, I favor the former over the latter, but that is a subject for a different article.   
307 See, e.g., Love, supra note 238, at 32 (“Unlike the blindfolded lady, the mediator sees all that is 
offered unprotected by formal procedure or rules of evidence. Unlike the arbitrator or the judge, the 
mediator may meet with the parties together or listen to them privately so that each nuance of meaning 
and each atom of possibility are captured and offered back, in their most palatable form, for the parties.”). 
308 See id. at 35 (“In this new millennium, we should continue to build novel processes, like the 
mini-trial, the summary jury trial, neutral experts, non-binding arbitration, medene (mediation combined 
with early neutral evaluation), arb-med and med-arb, but each new process must have a clear rationale 
and norms of practice which place it in the constellation of processes offering parties a coherent method 
of achieving justice.”). See also ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF 
MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 119–21 (2005) (advocating 
“transformative” approach to mediation that can broaden disputants’ perspectives even if no settlement 
is ultimately reached).  
309 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
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mother,310 we too may want to bring some disputes into the public eye both 
to educate the public and to seek the community’s input. That is, rather than 
relying so heavily on either judges or juries or on allowing individual 
disputants to work out their own problems, we could look for ways to obtain 
broader community participation in dispute resolution. The community 
might not only play a role in interpreting the technology itself, as has been 
discussed,311 but also be called upon to set out societal goals, to analyze 
disputants’ likely motivations, and to help devise appropriate remedies.   
If we were to seek greater community involvement, we would need to 
wrestle with the important conceptual issues regarding what community we 
are talking about. On the narrow side, perhaps neighbors in local 
communities are better suited than random jurors or judges to help set out 
goals, analyze disputants’ likely motivations, and figure out appropriate 
punishments/remedies. Local communities might be defined geographically, 
but also could be defined in racial, ethnic, religious, or other terms.312 On the 
other hand, we could also consider a very different and broader 
communitarian type of approach that might solicit a range of opinions from 
across the country or even the world. If part of our goal is to bring us together 
and come to more common understandings of justice issues, perhaps that is 
the route we would want to take. 
The internet offers us interesting logistical options if we want to solicit 
such community participation. For example, rather than rely on 
old-fashioned jury selection to try to secure a diverse body of twelve 
decisionmakers, we might use the internet to present legal issues to a much 
larger and potentially more diverse group of persons. Versions of this 
crowdsourcing are already being explored. For example, online marketer 
eBay has developed a system in which disputing buyers and sellers submit 
their alternative versions of disputes to a panel of “jurors” selected at random 
from among eBay community members who have applied to help resolve 
such disputes.313 Other online entities are similarly soliciting feedback from 
                                                                                                                     
310 See KADRI, supra note 197, at 4–5. 
311 See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
312 See, e.g., Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex “Marriage” Through Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 
1692–93 (1997) (“A community-enhancing understanding of mediation regards mediation instead as a 
means of helping individuals order their activities and resolve their disputes consistent with the values 
of some relevant community.”); Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New 
Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1240–41 (2011) 
(observing that religious arbitration courts “serve particular religious communities by enabling them to 
resolve disputes in accordance with their own shared religious values and obligations”).  
313 See Colin Rule & Chittu Nagarajan, Leveraging the Wisdom of Crowds: The eBay Community 
Court and the Future of Online Dispute Resolution, ACRESOLUTION, Winter 2010, at 5–6 (explaining 
how Ebay Community Court operates); see also Stipanowich, supra note 242, at 545 (same). 
 
 268 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1 
members of the public.314 And, as previously noted, some trial consultants 
are already using the internet to get feedback on aspects of their case.315 
The astute reader will have noticed that the various potential reforms 
here are in tension with one another and that each potential reform has likely 
downsides as well as benefits. Yet, while these ideas are in tension, they 
certainly are not in conflict. We need not resolve all disputes using the same 
process but rather could use trials for some, mediation for others, and 
community conversations for yet others. As commentators including this 
author have asserted, there are significant benefits to a “process pluralism” 
approach.316 We might resolve some disputes in each of these ways and thus 
will want to consider how best to assign disputes to particular processes. 
While the issue of which disputes should be assigned to which forum has no 
simple answer,317 it merits our increased attention. 
CONCLUSION 
We need to focus on how to reform our dispute resolution processes to 
take account of our exciting new technology. While the technology will not 
provide us with indisputable information regarding who did what to whom, 
it will certainly provide us with a great deal more and often better such 
information than we have had in the past. This Article has suggested that we 
need to respond to these developments in three important ways: (1) consider 
what forms of dispute resolution can help us resolve disputes pertaining to 
the technology itself; (2) consider what forms of dispute resolution can help 
us deal with human psychology that will inevitably impact our interpretation 
of technical information; and (3) consider what forms of dispute resolution 
can best help us move beyond mere truth to greater justice. It may not be 
obvious what forms of dispute resolution are best to deal with these three 
issues, but it is clear that we must not assume that the traditional approaches 
                                                                                                                     
314 See About PeopleClaim, PEOPLECLAIM, https://www.peopleclaim.com/about.aspx (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2019) (offering pro se disputants opportunity to receive input on their disputes from third 
parties, using the internet). See also Jurors, EJURY, http://www.ejury.com/jurors_learn_about.html (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2019) (providing attorneys with an opportunity to get feedback on their case from a 
panel of at least fifty persons who are each paid five to ten dollars).  
315 See supra text accompanying note 300.  
316 See Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice, supra note 244, at 555 (“Such values [for process 
pluralism] include the attempt to achieve peace with justice, choice and self-determination of the 
individual with care and responsibility for others, and recognition of the harms of the past with hopes for 
reconciliation in the future.”); Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing 
Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1488–89 (2004) 
(exploring which aspects of employment disputes should be resolved publicly or instead privately).   
317 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic 
Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2694–95 (1995) (stating that while it is 
impossible to decide, ex ante, what disputes should be assigned to what kind of procedural process, it is 
clear that certain issues are so important that they must be publicly decided); Sternlight, supra note 316, 
at 1488–89 (offering thoughts on which aspects of employment disputes should be resolved publicly or 
instead privately).   
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will necessarily continue to be our best means of resolving disputes. Instead, 
as we develop our new exciting technology, we must similarly be bold 
enough to rethink our dispute resolution processes. The difficulty of the 
endeavor should not deter us from taking on the challenge to rethink our 
systems of justice. 
 
